



COLONEL THEOPHILUS HIGGINSON

COMMANDANT of the 1st PUNJAB INFANTRY,
PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE,
INDIAN ARMY



A VICTORIAN C.B. PAIR AWARDED TO COLONEL T. HIGGINSON, 1ST PUNJAB INFANTRY, PUNJAB FRONTIER FORCE



The Most Honourable Order of the Bath, C.B. (Military) Companion's Breast Badge, 18ct Gold and Enamel, Hallmarks for London 1886, with Integral Gold Riband Buckle; C.B. and 2nd Afghan Medal 1878-80, No Clasp, named to: (MAJ: T. HIGGINSON. 1ST. PUNJ: INF:)

The Punjab Frontier Force School

"Outside of the English Universities no school of character exists to compare with the Frontier; and character is there moulded, not by attrition with fellow men in the arts of studies of peace, but in the furnace of responsibility and on the anvil of self-reliance¹."

- Lord Curzon, 1907.

Family Information

Theophilus Higginson was born in Lisburn, County Antrim,

Ireland, on 4 April 1839 into the Irish landed gentry family of Higginson of Carnalea, County Down. The family was founded by an English gentleman who accompanied the Army of William III to Ireland in 1669 with the Commissariat Department and was given land in Ireland for his services. Carnalea House was an 81-acre estate in Crawfordsburn, County Down.

Theophilus was the 4th son of Henry Theophilus Higginson (1798-1869), of Carnalea House, Crawfordsburn, County Down, Captain, Derriaghie Yeomanry, High Sheriff of Carrickfergus, 1849, married, in 1825, Charlotte, only surviving daughter and heiress of John McConnell, of Belfast. Her family was one of the claimants of the dormant Earldom of Menteith.

Education and Commission



¹ George Nathaniel Curzon, "Frontiers," Lecture, 1907 Romanes Lecture at University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, November 2, 1907. Reprinted as a bound volume by Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.


Sir James Weir Hogg, 1st Baronet (1790 – 27 May 1876) was an Irish-born businessman, lawyer and politician and a Chairman of the East India Company. He recommended Theophilus Higginson for a direct Cadetship to the Madras Army of the East India Company.

Theophilus Higginson's entry into the service was 31 January 1856. He was not yet 17 years old and would be confirmed for a commission before he turned 17 on 4 April 1856. He had three letters of recommendation from private schooling being educated in the "Classics and Mathematics" dated from 1854 to 1855. Six days after his entry into the service he received an Addiscombe Certificate dated 6 February 1856, having been certified in Mathematics, Fortification and French.

A Baptism Certificate shows he was baptized in the Parish of Lisburn on 4 May 1839 and was a confirmed member of the Church of England.

He passed his Medical Examination and was certified as fit for the service on 26 January 1856.

His Cadet Papers were completed and signed on 25 June 1856 and Theophilus Higginson was on his way for a career in the first, the Madras Army of the East India Company and then second, in the British Indian Army.



He was commissioned Ensign in the Madras Army on 26 June 1856.

Early Service in the 22nd Madras Native Infantry 1856-1864

⇐ *The 22nd Madras NI in the Punjab in 1861. Published in Qureshi, Maj MI. (1958). The First Punjabis: History of the First Punjab Regiment, 1759-1956. (Photograph on the left)*

Ensign Theophilus Higginson was first appointed to the 22nd Regiment of Madras Native Infantry on 26 August 1856 his Army rank dated from his commission date of 26 June 1856. The regiment was stationed at Secunderbad. In 1857 the regiment was ordered to the Straits of Malacca. He was promoted to Lieutenant 24 July 1858.

After several years' service in the Straits of Malacca the regiment returned to India. In the early to mid-1860's they were assigned to duty in the Punjab.

⇐ *Illustration on the left by Thomson, J. (John), 1837-1921 (photographer) of the 22nd Bengal Native Infantry at Penang, 1862 assembled in dress uniform in the field with the Regimental Band on the right in white uniforms.*



Lieutenant Higginson would be appointed to the 1st Punjab Infantry after serving 8 years with the 22nd Regiment of Madras Native Infantry. During his service with this regiment, he became an officer with the skills considered by Punjab command


necessary to fill an appointment to a Rifle Regiment active with the Punjab Irregular Force on the Punjab Frontier.

Appointed to the 1st Punjab Infantry

Lieutenant T. Higginson, Madras Staff Corps was appointed acting Wing Officer, 1st Punjab Infantry, in October 1864².

In the late 1880's as Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry Colonel Higginson compiled the "Digest of Services of the 1st (Coke's) Regiment Punjab Infantry," published in Simla by the Chronicle Press in 1888. This is the most important source for the activities of this regiment. Considering that in 1864 the regiment was only 15 years old as a young officer appointed at this time Higginson was in a position where he met the founding officer of the regiment and served with some of the principal officers who had raised the regiment. In 1888 the regiment was 39 years old and Colonel Higginson had served as a regimental officer for 24 years and had risen to Commandant of the regiment making it difficult to imagine a man better positioned to record the history of this regiment. This history will be depended on for much of the regimental detail from this account. Colonel Higginson's daily entries will be marked in *italics*, quoted sections will be footnoted. This author has taken some editorial liberties to make the account read easier.

Historical Background: The Punjab Irregular Force (PIF)



During the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries British and Indian troops conducted an almost unbroken series of operations against the trans-border Pathan tribes on the North-West Frontier of India. Warfare in tribal territory was very different from conventional European warfare and other colonial campaigns due to the mountainous terrain and tribal military characteristics and armament.

In the Northwest Frontier, Western Asia and parts of the Subcontinent the term 'tribe' and 'tribal' is used with pride as a marker of nobility. The tribal system does or did not only reside in remote and backward areas but permeated and still permeates today all levels of the society from the nomad camp up to the royal palace, from the remote mountain village up into all complex social institutions

and to the headquarters of the armed forces. Belonging to a tribe means to be of distinguished and old ancestry, to belonging to genuine people, to be dependable. As a tribal one is bound by a network of primordial obligations on the solid basis of well-structured genealogical ties. Such notions are linked to pride and honour, not to inferiority. Arab rulers would be deeply offended if their tribal background was questioned, Afghan dignitaries and intellectuals increasingly use their tribal names

² Higginson, Theophilus, Digest of Services of the 1st (Coke's) Regiment Punjab Infantry, Simla: Chronicle Press, 1888, p. 35

as a second name, a similar tendency is noticeable in Pakistan, e.g. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a former President of Pakistan preferred to appear in tribal costume on official occasions³.

The localized Punjab Irregular Force (PIF) developed a unique range of principles and minor tactics to conduct military operations in tribal territory and acquired a high degree of expertise in frontier warfare. These skills were disseminated within the force by means of oral tradition, specialized training, and Standing orders combined with frequent practical experience. However, such skills were not retained or disseminated to the regular Bengal Army which concentrated on training for conventional military operations.

The task of maintaining the peace on the Northwest Frontier is not an easy one. The Afghan is a born fighter and the skills of fighting are learned from an early age in the difficult rough terrain of the mountains of Afghanistan. To maintain the peace requires a force specially trained to address the problems of fighting in these mountains.

‘The Mahsud or Wazir is an expert at attacking convoys or small detachments and is assisted by the nature of his country, the ravines being narrow and winding, while the hillsides... are often thickly covered in bushes. He attacks systematically, with special parties being told off for specific duties, such as the neutralisation of adjacent picquets by fire, support to his advanced parties of swordsmen etc.

‘Ambushes may sometimes open by a few shots from one side of a nullah. Untrained troops rush to cover on the side from which the fire comes. This is what is waited for. Heavy accurate fire from the other bank then finishes the party.’ (Pamphlet issued by HQ Waziristan District, 1924)

The Mountains, Pathans and Weapons and Infantry Development for the PIF

The martial skills developed and refined by individual tribesmen during years of feuding and inter-tribal warfare made lashkars (fighting section or tribal War Party) highly effective. Accustomed to fighting from youth, Pathan tribesmen were physically fit, skilled at both skirmishing and close quarter fighting, fieldcraft, the use of arms and were inured to local diseases.

Unlike imperial troops, tribesmen were intimately acquainted with the local terrain, paths, and resources. Tribal clothing - baggy trousers, grass chaplis on feet, flowing grey shirts bound with leather ammunition belts and untidy pagris - and their skill in utilizing the hillsides for cover and concealment made it difficult to locate tribesmen skirmishing over the hills. Tribal lashkars normally attempted to hold defensive positions at ridges or passes which were heavily fortified with sangars, sited to allow frontal and flanking fire on the probable line of advance of an attacking force, where they would mount a determined resistance. Each tribesman fought according to personal judgement once fighting began exploiting the terrain for cover and concealment, advancing or retiring as the fighting developed. Pathan tribesmen would seldom remain to fight at close-quarters with the assaulting troops and, if their flanks, rear or line of retreat were threatened, would disperse into the surrounding hills before an organized pursuit could be mounted. Lashkars excelled at desultory hit-and-run guerilla warfare, attacking isolated parties of troops, raiding convoys on the lines of communication, sniping foraging parties, and attacking rearguards at the end of each day's operations.

When the situation offered a prospect of success the tribesmen would seize the opportunity to attack with considerable enthusiasm and engage in vicious hand-to-hand combat using swords and knives with considerable skill. Their speed and mobility across the rough, precipitous terrain, enabled lashkars to ebb and flow around Indian columns and easily evade attacks by organized bodies of troops giving them the freedom to choose the time and place for an attack and to keep the initiative.

The locally manufactured firearms, long knives, swords, and shields employed by trans-border Pathan lashkars also greatly affected Indian tactics. Following the First Afghan War the Pathan tribes had steadily acquired increasing numbers of matchlock or flintlock jezails, a specialized Afghan developed muzzle-loading rifled musket, whose range and accuracy outclassed the Brown Bess percussion muskets employed by Indian troops giving tribesmen a distinct qualitative advantage in small arms. Jezails allowed lashkars to harass British columns from out of range without effective reply. The acquisition

³ *The Pashtun Tribal System*, Bernt Glatzer, In G. Pfeffer & D. K. Behera (eds.): *Concept of Tribal Society (Contemporary Society: Tribal Studies, Vol 5)*, New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002, pp 265-282.

of jezails altered tribal methods from reliance on shock tactics and hand-to-hand combat to guerrilla warfare against Indian columns. However, jezails were not as highly effective as many Indian officers believed. Tests on two jezails purchased in the Khyber Pass in 1875, by the Adjutant-General for Musketry, indicated that the effectiveness of these weapons had been overestimated by those troops against which they had been used. Both weapons were crudely manufactured, inaccurate and had an effective range of only 300 yards⁴. The early development of PIF infantry tactics based on the belief in longer than actual effective jezail range may actually have been an advantage in increasing the effectiveness of the fire, cover fire and movement tactics of the PIF.

The majority of tribesmen were armed with swords, knives and shields, making them reliant on combat at close quarters. However, a combination of charges mounted by large numbers of Pathan swordsmen, concerted with Jezail fire, posed a difficult problem for imperial troops who were forced to mass in close contact with each other making them, in turn, vulnerable to rifle fire⁵.

The PIF's regiments and batteries quickly learnt that conventional tactics, training and equipment devised for operations on the Indian plains against similarly armed, organized and trained troops, were of little use in tribal territory. Indeed, it was soon apparent that military operations against the trans-border Pathan tribes represented a distinctive form of warfare requiring the development of operational principles and specific minor tactics for each arm of service. It was fortunate that the ranks of several PIF regiments had officers with prior experience of the tribes, dating from the First Afghan War, who could provide initial guidance in the tactics of mountain warfare against a tribal opponent. The PIF's infantry regiments soon learned that the tribes were unwilling to engage in a stand-up fight with Indian troops. Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner at Bannu, noted in September 1853:

“It is not the policy and never has been the practice of any of the tribes on this frontier to meet our troops openly in the field. Any operations in which this force has been engaged have been skirmishing of greater or less magnitude, on broken or hilly ground... The tribes are not likely to alter their tactics which are the best indeed they could adopt. When strife occurs therefore it will always be of the same character⁶.”

The infantry regiments bore the brunt of the fighting in tribal territory and their men had to employ light infantry skills in place of ponderous formal battalion drill, with its reliance on iron collective discipline, close-order line and column formations that dominated training in the regular Bengal Army. It was impossible to maintain close-order infantry formations or exploit disciplined massed firepower across the broken hill sides making it essential to employ loose, flexible, skirmishing tactics, modelled on those used by their Pathan opponents utilizing the ground for cover and concealment. Additionally, they had to develop the individual skills of marksmanship and fieldcraft along with sufficient physical fitness to enable them to move quickly over the hillsides carrying their arms, ammunition and equipment. The dispersion required on the battlefield meant officers and men had to be self-reliant, well-motivated and able to exercise considerable individual initiative in comparison to those serving in the regular army. Personal equipment was reduced to a minimum light marching order and men frequently wore grass sandals in place of boots to increase their mobility. A less conspicuous khaki uniform was adopted by infantry regiments in January 1853, instead of the heavy and easily noticeable scarlet clothing used in the Bengal Army, to provide effective camouflage during operations conducted against the brown backdrop of the arid border hills⁷. The smoothbore percussion musket, with which most of the infantry regiments were equipped, also proved unsuitable for fighting in the hills. Its short range, inaccuracy and heavy weight placed Indian troops at a marked disadvantage when opposed by lightly equipped tribesmen armed with jezails. During operations in the hills bordering the Derajat the superiority of the rifles arming the 1st Punjab Infantry was quickly demonstrated and Brigadier General J. S. Hodgson requested in May 1853 that the light companies in each infantry regiment should be armed with similar weapons, so that they could be brigaded together to form a corps of riflemen in event of an emergency:

⁴ Lt. -Col. W. Gordon, Chief Inspector of Musketry, to the Adj. -Gen., 4th Dec. 1867, L/MIL/3/784, Christiansen, op cit, pp. 286-7 and Elliot, op cit, p. 111.

⁵ Maj. W. MacKinnon, 'Jezail Experiments', J-U. S. I. I., 4,20, (1875), pp. 201-3.

⁶ Maj. J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner, to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 4th Sept. 1853, F/4/2549.

⁷ Selections from the Records of the Government of India. (Foreign Department). No. administration of the Punjab, Territories, comprising the Cis and Trans-Sutlej States, for the Years 1851-52 and 1852-53, (Calcutta, 1853), PP-36-7 V/23/1 (Hereafter Selections from Records No. VI).

“The nature of Hill warfare presents almost invariably the same characteristics. Viz: an enemy previously posted in favourable positions and enjoying the superior advantage of good cover, to dislodge them from which necessitates great personal exposure on the part of the attacking party. I have therefore considered it most incumbent on me to recommend that the Light Companies of the Punjaub Infantry should be supplied with the Rifle, as a weapon obviously better calculated to meet these difficulties, and the possession of which would, besides, inspiring increased confidence, enable soldiers so armed to oppose on comparatively equal terms a well placed foe firing from a rest with the long range jezail⁸.”

FIRST REGIMENT.			
Rank and Name.	Corps.	Date of Appt.	Remarks.
Capt. J. Coke	10th N.I.	18 May 849	Commandant 2d in command
Lieut. C. P. Keyes (Mad.)	30th N.I.	18 May 849	Adjutant
SECOND REGIMENT.			
Capt. J. C. Johnston	29th N.I.	18 May 849	Commandant
Lieut. J. D. Willan	44th do	do	2d in command
Ensign J. J. Eckford	6th do	11 July	Adjutant
THIRD REGIMENT.			
Lieut. R. Moorcroft (Mad.)	19th N.I.	18 May 849	Commandant
— B. Henderson	48th do	do	2d in command
— A. T. Wilde (Mad.)	19th do	14 Mar. 850	Adjutant
FOURTH REGIMENT.			
Capt. H. O. Marshall (Mad.)	42d N.I.	18 May 849	Commandant
Lieut. G. G. Dennis	1st Fus.	do	2d in command
— B. T. Reid	34th N.I.	do	Adjutant
FIFTH REGIMENT.			
Capt. J. E. Gastrell	13th N.I.	18 May 849	Commandant
Lieut. G. W. G. Green	2d Eur. Fus.	do	2d in command
— W. M'Neile	5th N.I.	do	Adjutant

The proposal to rearm PIF regiments with rifles was widely supported by political and military officers accustomed to tribal tactics, although it was felt that a small proportion of muskets should be kept in case of a major incursion into the plains or hostilities with Afghan troops⁹. The training given to light infantry regiments was also deemed of special importance for fighting against Pathan irregulars. Major J. D. Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Punjab Government, noted:

“The drill also of Rifle Corps give the men a great superiority over soldiers trained to the Battalion exercise. In the one case the men are taught to act singly, to take advantage of all cover, to rely on the excellence of their weapon...¹⁰”

⇐ *INFANTRY REGIMENTS of the PUNJAB IRREGULAR FORCE from their first appearance in the East India Register in 1850, p. 171-173.*

Two complete regiments were re-armed with two-grooved Brunswick Rifles so that rifle regiments could be stationed permanently at Kohat, and in the Upper and Lower Derajat, in addition to the flank companies of the remaining units. Although slow and difficult to load in comparison to the musket, the greater accuracy and range of 200-300 yards enabled Indian troops to oppose tribal lashkars on equal terms for the first time.

The number of Brunswick rifles issued to the infantry steadily increased until, by 1856, four complete infantry regiments and the light companies of the remaining four had received the weapon¹¹. As new model rifles came into use the PIF would be quickly re-armed with them, and rifle marksmanship was a skill of training emphasis.

The 1st Regiment Punjab Infantry (Coke's)

The regiment was raised on 18 May 1849 as the 1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry by Captain John Coke. Following is the 19th Century changes to regimental titles:

- 1849 raised as 1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry by Captain John Coke
- 1851 retitled as the 1st Regiment of Infantry, Punjab Irregular Force
- 1865 became the 1st Regiment of Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force

⁸ Brig. J. S. Hodgson, Commanding Punjab Irregular Force, to Maj. H. D. Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Commissioner, 29th April 1853, P/200/36.

⁹ Lt. -Col. Mackeson, Commissioner & Superintendent Peshawar Division, to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 2nd Sept. 1853, Brig. J. S. Hodgson, Commanding Punjab Irregular Force, to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Offg. Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, 4th Sept. 1853, and Capt. J. Coke, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry to Maj. J. D. Macpherson, 22nd Dec. 1853, F/4/2549

¹⁰ Maj. J. D. Macpherson, Offg. Military Secretary Chief Commissioner Punjab, to Lt. -Col R. J. Birch, Offg. Secretary to the Govt. of India in the Military Department, 11th Oct. 1853, F/4/2549.

¹¹ Selections from Records No. VI, p. 37 and Records of the Government of India Report on the Administration of Public Affairs in the Punjaub Territories from 1854-55 to 1855-56 Inclusive, (Calcutta, 1856), pp. 94-5 V/10/2

1901 became 1st Punjab Infantry

1903 became 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force)

It was one of five such regiments ordered to be raised by Colonel Henry Lawrence, the agent (and brother) of the Governor-General of the Punjab frontier region, John Lawrence, 1st Baron Lawrence, to form the infantry element of the Trans Frontier Brigade. The men were recruited from veterans of disbanded opposition forces after the British annexation in 1848 of the Punjab during the Second Sikh War. The order to raise the regiment stipulated the regiment, “be composed of Eusufzaies, Hindustanis, and Sikhs, in equal proportions.” In 1851 the regiment was retitled as the 1st Regiment of Infantry, Punjab Irregular Force when the Trans Frontier Brigade, tasked with policing the volatile Northwest Frontier, was expanded and renamed the Punjab Irregular Force (PIF), giving rise to the “Piffer” name adopted by the officers and men of the regiments of the PIF and still used to this day by their successor regiments. A system of permanent Cantonments and Station Posts was established along the frontier border with Afghanistan at Quetta, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Rawal Pindee, Edwardesabad, Bunnoo, Rajanpore, Roree, Khota, Abbottabad and Murdan to allow the PIF to quickly react to military situations as they developed. The regiments of the PIF would become very familiar with these cantonments as the century progressed.

After the regiment was raised, they did campaign service along the frontier with the Punjab Irregular Force up to the start of the Indian Mutiny.

In 1857 the Indian Mutiny began and the regiment, like many other Indian units, remained loyal to the British. During the British-Indian siege of rebel-held Delhi (begun on 30 May) the 1st Punjab Infantry was part of the 3rd Column, commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, KCB. On 14 September the column was tasked with storming the Kashmiri Gate—a part of the walled defences of Delhi—which they successfully achieved. Fierce fighting, however, ensued and Delhi was not fully retaken until 20 September. The rebellion was finally quelled by July 1858.

In 1863 the 1st Punjab Infantry took part in the Umbeyla campaign in the Northwest Frontier. At the Crag Picquet the regiment saw fierce fighting on 30 October, to such an extent that the regiment was compelled to withdraw from the hill; it was retaken shortly afterwards, and two Victoria Crosses (VC) were later awarded. One of the VC recipients was Henry William Pitcher of the 4th Punjabis, who later joined the 1st Punjab Infantry and served with Higginson. On 5 July 1875, while serving in the 1st Punjab Infantry, Henry Pitcher died at Dehra Ghazi Khan, aged only 34, and was buried in the town's cemetery. Later owing to flooding around the cemetery, he was re-interred in Dehra Ismail Khan Cemetery, Kohat. Further fighting took place at Crag Picquet in November, which involved the regiment.

Captain Henry Pitcher wearing the uniform of a Bengal Staff Corps officer, his Victoria Cross and campaign medals are visible in the photograph.⇒



In 1865 the Punjab Irregular Force was renamed the Punjab Frontier Force and the regiment's title was consequently changed to become the 1st Regiment of Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.

In 1878, the Second Afghan War began, and the regiment participated as part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Kandahar Field Force, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart. Major Higginson served as second in command of the 1st Punjab Infantry during the Second Afghan War. The force captured the city of Kandahar on 8 January 1879. The regiment was awarded the Theatre Honour “Afghanistan 1878–79” for their participation in the initial campaign of the war. The conflict did not conclude until 1880.

The 1890s saw the 1st Punjab Infantry involved in several major operations against the hostile tribes on the North-West Frontier of India. These included Maizar, and Waziristan on 10 June 1897, when the regiment was ambushed in an action that signified the beginning of a large tribal uprising against the British. The beginning of the 20th century gave the regiment no respite, and it took part in further operations in Waziristan in 1901. That same year it became, simply, the 1st Punjab Infantry. In 1903, the regiment was designated a rifle regiment and retitled as the 55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force), named in honour of the regiment's founder. In 1908, the Regiment took part in the Mohmand expedition on the North-West Frontier.

The British had two main aims in dealing with the North-West Frontier.

The first was to prevent raiding from the mountains into the settled, law-abiding lowland areas. By punishing recalcitrant tribes, they were able to maintain British prestige and ensure that the subjects of British India would continue to believe in the political will and military power of their rulers.

The second major aim was to prevent a Russian invasion from the north-west. Throughout the 19th century, Russia expanded its domains through Central Asia, coming ever closer to India. This potential threat continued to occupy the minds of British policy makers.

There was disagreement as to how these aims could be achieved. But two schools of thought emerged.

'Close Border' policy

Supporters of the 'Close Border' policy argued that it was best to have as little to do with the tribal areas as possible, to manage the tribes and mount expeditions against them if they offended.

To counter any invasion threat, they argued that it was better to wait, well supplied, on the line of the River Indus and let the enemy deal with the problem of both the mountains and the tribes.

Favoured by the Punjab government, this approach generally prevailed for the first three decades of British rule.

'Forward' policy

Advocates of the 'Forward' policy called for a more active intervention in tribal affairs. They pointed out that if the British controlled the passes leading into India from Afghanistan, its forces would be better placed to deal with any Russian invasion.

This approach, which came to the fore between the late 1870s and the 1900s, led to many forays into the tribal areas. It also caused a full-scale invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan in 1878 - which further served to inflame the border tribes - and brought about the eventual delineation of the border with that country from 1893 onwards.

This period also witnessed the building of a system of advanced garrisons in forts spread across the tribal areas, as well as the creation of political agencies to oversee many of the region's semi-independent rulers.



⇐ *Khasadars*

Beginning in 1892, the British also appointed Khasadars who were raised in Waziristan and other Northwest Frontier districts of British India. Their prime functions during this period included the provision of picquets and escorts to protect camel convoys and other travellers when regular soldiers of the PIF and Indian Army were not available. They wore the normal clothing of the tribal groups from which they were recruited, distinguished by arm bands bearing the letter K.

These were also commanded by officers on attachment from Indian Army units. But the selection of rank-and-file khasadars was left to the tribes, who chose the most respected men in their communities to be

their protectors. The khasadars had the power to arrest, call for tribal jirgas (councils) or dispense justice on the spot, if offenders put up resistance.



Punitive expeditions

On the whole, punitive expeditions were employed as a last resort, when other methods such as bribes (officially known as subsidies), blockades, fines and seizures of goods had failed. Normally, an expedition would destroy crops, water tanks, forts or villages to force a tribe to hand over criminals or pay compensation. Most expeditions involved a combination of men from the Punjab Frontier Force, locally raised levies led by British officers, and regular British, Indian and Gurkha troops. Artillery batteries, equipped with light movable mountain guns, often provided extra firepower.

Higginson's Early Regimental Service

⇐ Photograph¹² of officers of the 1st Punjab Infantry General Sir John Coke is seated centre. The officer in the left corner of the back row is believed to be Lieutenant Higginson.

October 1864.

Lieutenant T. Higginson, Madras Staff Corps was appointed acting Wing Officer, 1st Punjab Infantry, in October 1864¹³. He was serving at Bangalore where the 22nd Madras Native Infantry had been posted since 26 March 1862. This talented officer's appointment to another regiment must have created some distress among the leadership in the 22nd because Lieutenant Higginson was simultaneously holding the appointments of Adjutant, Interpreter and Quarter Master in the regiment.

29 November 1865.

On 29 November 1865, the Regiment marched from Abbottabad in course of Relief and arrived at Dera Ismail Khan, on 23 December 1865.

Swat River near Ama Kheyl, Northwest Frontier Province ⇒



1866

Lieutenant Colonel Keyes, C.B. Commandant obtained leave to England on Medical Certificate, 15 February 1866, and made over Command of the Corps to Captain Keen.

1868

¹² <https://www.trusleyestate.com/coke-family>

¹³ Higginson, Theophilus, Digest of Services of the 1st (Coke's) Regiment Punjab Infantry, Simla: Simla Chronicle Press, 1888, p. 35

12 January 1868. *Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., returned from furlough. and resumed Command of the Regiment at Ama Kheyl.*

Captain F. J. Keen, 2nd-in-Command and Wing Officer, obtained leave on Medical Certificate to England on the (date left blank) 1868 and Lieutenant H. Pitcher, V.C., Wing Officer, was appointed to officiate as 2nd in Command and Wing officer during Captain Keen's absence.



26 June. *Lieutenant Higginson was promoted to Captain.*

11-24 December. *The Regiment marched from Dera Ismail Khan in course of Relief on 11 December and arrived at Kohat 24 December 1868.*

← *Kohat Cantonment and the cantonment church.*

1869

Attack on the Bezotee Village of Gara, 24-25 February 1869

“On the night of 24 February 1869, the Regiment was ordered on service with the whole of the troops in the Kohat Garrison to punish the refractory section of the Bezotee Tribe, for an outrage on

a police post at the foot of the Kohat Kotul.”

“Made a successful night march over the Bezotee Ooblan Kotul and at day light (25 February) attacked and destroyed the Bezotee village of Gara, inflicting severe loss on the enemy, killing their chief ‘Tor Syud Ruzza’ and several of their most influential men.”

The Regiment lost on this occasion one sepoy killed and 12 wounded. The Regiment behaved with great spirit and gallantry. Captain Higginson brought off his men from the crest of the Kotul in the final retirement with great coolness and steadiness under a smart fire¹⁴.”

Captain Higginson earned the thanks of the Government for his service on this occasion.

Served Meranzie Valley Field Force in April 1869 and at the Punishment of the Cabul Kheyl Wazerees, 16 April 1869

“On 16 April 1869, the Head Quarters Wing of the Regiment under Command of Captain Higginson moved from Kohat into the Meeranzme valley to punish the Cabul Kheyl Wazerees for a raid committed by them on the village of Thull.

The Force consisted of —

- 4th Punjab Cavalry.
- 2-Guns, No. 1 Light Field Battery,
- 2 - (7-prs.) Steel guns, Punjab Mountain Battery.
- 1st Punjab Infantry Head Quarters Wing.

¹⁴ Higginson, p. 35-36.

The Force reached Thull on the 22nd. But the Cabul Kheyl Wazeerees having made their submission and having agreed to the terms imposed upon them by Government and giving hostages for their future good behaviour, it was found unnecessary to cross the Kurum or to proceed to extremities against these Tribes. The Force re-entered Cantonments on 1 May 1869. Furlough had been opened and leave certificates had been distributed to those whose turn, it was for furlough, when the sudden order for their detention was received. The cheerfulness and alacrity of the men in attending the call for service and their excellent conduct while employed was worthy of all praise¹⁵.”

Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B.¹⁶, Commandant of the Regiment having been appointed officiating Commandant of the Corps of Guides, left the Regiment for Hote Murdan, 8 May 1869. Lieutenant Pitcher V.C., 2nd-in-Command assumes Command.

Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B., farewell order to the Regiment will be found below:

R. O. No. 245, dated Kohat, 8th May 1869.

“Lieutenant Colonel Keyes, Commanding, having been appointed to the Corps of Guides, he cannot relinquish the Command of a Regiment with which he has been so many years associated without placing on record his deep sense of obligation to the officers under his Command for their cordial assistance and for their zealous attention to their duty and to the interest of the Regiment.

The late Sir C. Napier when Commander-in-Chief, bore witness to the “fine spirit” which its “excellent leader” Captain Coke had infused into the Regiment. In looking back on the 20 years that have elapsed since the regiment was raised, it is no slight source of congratulation to be able to record that the harmony of the Regiment has never once been disturbed by any misunderstanding between the officers. Such unanimity, engendering as it does a soldierly feeling, must have had its due effect on the men and have materially aided in the maintenance of that “fine spirit” which I am proud to think, has ever distinguished the corps.

To Captain Coke its “excellent leader” that spirit is due, and I know it is a source of happiness to him, to learn that the Regiment is proud of its heritage.

2. Captain P. J. Keen joined the Regiment at Umbeyla in 1863 and he subsequently held command during my absence on Furlough. I am much indebted to him, for his hearty co-operation and for the manner in which he exercised his authority while in temporary Command. He is now himself absent in England on Medical Certificate, but it is a matter of extreme satisfaction to me to think, that he will succeed to the permanent command.

To Captain Pitcher V.C., and Captain Higginson, Commandants of Wings, I offer my best thanks for the zeal and interest they have shown in their work, also to Lieutenant Vallings, the Adjutant of the Regiment, who has rendered every assistance, and who has conducted the duties of his important office to my entire satisfaction.

To the Native officers and men and more especially to Habeeb Khan, Sirdar Bahadur, Subadar Major and to Pyab Khan, Subadar I beg to express my warm appreciation of their gallantry and devotion in the field, and of their uniform excellent conduct in quarters. I wish them to believe that my association with the 1st Punjab Infantry will ever be amongst the proudest and happiest recollections of my life. With every good wish for their increased honor and success, I bid the Regiment a hearty farewell¹⁷.”

From the *Gazette of India* 26 June 1869:

¹⁵ Higginson, p. 36-37.

¹⁶ General Sir Charles Patton Keyes, GCB, JP (25 November 1822 – 5 February 1896) was a British Indian Army officer. He was commissioned into the 30th Madras Native Infantry in 1843 and was promoted to the rank of captain in 1858. He served as commanding officer of the 1st Punjab Infantry, Queen's Own Corps of Guides, Punjab Field Force and the 9th (Secunderabad) Division. He latterly served with the Indian Staff Corps. Keyes was promoted to major-general in 1881 and General in 1889. He was made Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath in the 1891 Birthday Honours. In retirement he held the office of Justice of the Peace for Kent.

¹⁷ Higginson, p. 99.

Military Department 23 June 1869, No. 680 of 1869. His Excellency the Governor-General in Council is pleased to make the following appointment in the 1st Punjab Infantry. Captain F.J. Keen, 2nd in Command and Wing Officer (now on Furlough) to be Commandant vice Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Keyes, C.B.

1870

View into North Waziristan taken by Rizwan Ullah Wazir ⇒

The Regiment formed the Escort to His Honor the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir Henry Durand, and marched towards Edwardesabad on 19 December 1870, reaching Edwardes bad on 23 December 1870, and returned to Kohat on 30 December 1870.



1871

On 12 December 1871 the Regiment marched from Kohat in the course of Relief and arrived at Edwardesabad, on 16 December 1871.

1872

On 6 February 1872, the Head Quarters, 368 Rifles marched to the mouth of the Tochi Pass, and on the 7th the Regiment “fell in at 4 A.M., formed a part of a Force to operate against some villages in our Valley. The Regiment marched up the bed of a stream and over boulders, crossing the Shinkee Kotol into the Valley some 12 or 13 miles and arrival saw the Enemy drawn up in front of the large village of Hyder Kheyl, they fired on Skirmishers of the 1st Sikhs who returned it and drove the enemy in and through the village, killing a number. The Regiment was sent to make a demonstration against the village of Haipee, but it seeing the fate of Hyder Kheyl gave in, and the Regiment returned by the same route, reaching Camp at 10 P.M., after having done a very hard days work in the way of marching and that very cheerfully. The men were 18 hours under arms. The Regiment was a great deal employed on Rear Guard on this occasion. It returned to Edwardesabad on 8 February 1872 (see Map Appendix: Map of the 6-7 February 1872 Operations in the Tochi Pass).

1873

Baptisms solemnized at St. George's Church, (Edwardesabad) (Bannoo).

When Baptized		Child to be born		Child's Christian Name	Sex	Parents Names		Place	Quality, Trade or Profession	Signature by whom Baptized
Year	Month	Day	Year			Month	Day			
1873	November	9 th	1873	October	5 th	Female	Adolphus & Blanche Mary	Edwardesabad	Capt. Brevet Staff Capt.	J. Brodie, C., M., S.
1873	December	21 st	1873	November	10 th	Male	Harold & Whitley	Bannoo	Capt. & Adjutant Staff Capt. 2 nd in Command 1 st Punjab Infantry	J. Brodie, C., M., S.
1873	December	28 th	1873	October	5 th	Male	John & Harriet	Bannoo	Secy in Charge of the Mission	J. Brodie, C., M., S.

I, William Matthews, the vicar do hereby certify, that the foregoing are true and faithful copies of all entries in the Register of Baptisms kept at St. George's Church, Edwardesabad, as therein entered and made between the first day of October and last day of December 1873.

W. M. Matthews
Wife's my hand,
W. M. Matthews
Chaplain of the Brevet.

The end of 1873 held some happy baptism events for officers of the 1st Punjab Regiment at St. Georges Church, at Edwardesabad (Bannoo, Banu, Bannu). On 9 November Captain Adolphus Vallings, Regimental Adjutant and his wife Blanche Mary celebrated the baptism of Blanche Violet Mary born on 5 October and on 21 December Wing Officer Captain Higginson and his

wife Ada celebrated the baptism of Harold Whitla born on 10 November. These events were important celebrations in the life of the regiment. At this time there were only 8 British officers in this regiment, and they worked closely together within the regiment on a daily basis and socially outside the regiment they lived as neighbors with their families closely tied. Harold Whitla Higginson would be commissioned in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers and rise in rank to Major General in the British Army in World War I and after.

On 7 February No. 58 of 1874 Gazette of India, Captain T. Higginson. Wing Officer is appointed officiating 2nd in Command and Wing Officer 3rd Sikh Infantry.

Appendix R

R. O. No. 79 of 1874

“The Commanding officer much regrets the departure of Captain T. Higginson for a time, from the Regiment and he takes this opportunity of placing upon record his high appreciation of his services while with it. Captain T. Higginson joined the Regiment in 1864 as Officiating Wing Officer. In 1869 he obtained the permanent Wing Officership, and for the last two years, has officiated as 2nd in Command, the important duties of which appointment he has performed entirely to the Commanding Officer's satisfaction, who congratulates him on reaping the reward of his indefatigable zeal and steady attention to his duties. By patiently attending to the wants of the men of his Wing he has completely gained their confidence and one and all regret his leaving. He earned the thanks of Government for his conduct at Gara, 1869. In leaving the Regiment to officiate as 2nd in Command 3rd Sikhs, Captain Higginson takes with him the good wishes of all for his future success, and he may look back with pride and satisfaction to the work he has done in the Regiment.”

“Captain H. W. Pitcher V.C., 2nd in Command and Officiating Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry.”
p. 100

Historical Record 3rd Sikh Infantry, p. 28-29

On 16 January 1874, in G. O. No. 56, Major G. N. Money was appointed to officiate as Commandant and Captain T. Higginson, Wing Officer, 1st Punjab Infantry, to officiate as 2nd in Command.

The regiment marched to Puniulla on the 13th January to a Camp of Exercise consisting of the Dera Ismail Khan garrison, *viz.*, 5th Punjab Cavalry, No. 2 Light Field Battery, 3rd Sikhs, 6th Punjab Infantry, and the Edwardesabad garrison, *viz.*, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, No. 3 Light Field Battery, 1st Sikhs and 1st Punjab Infantry, the whole under the command of Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force. Camp broke up on the 31st January.

The regiment arrived at Dera Ismail Khan on the 7th February, and was inspected by the Brigadier-General on the 10th and 11th *idem*.

On the 13th February Captain T. Higginson joined.

The regiment was inspected by Brigadier-General C. P. Keyes, C.B., on the 29th December.

The regiment marched from Dera Ismail Khan, on the 3rd January on relief by the 2nd Sikhs, and arrived at Kohat on the 15th *idem*.

Snider rifles were received and issued at Kohat on the 15th January.

The British .577 Snider–Enfield was a breech-loading rifle. The American Jacob Snider invented this firearm action, and the Snider–Enfield was one of the most widely used of the Snider varieties. The British Army adopted it in 1866 as a conversion system for its ubiquitous Pattern 1853 Enfield muzzle-loading rifles, and used it until 1874 when the Martini–Henry rifle began to supersede it. The British Indian Army used the Snider–Enfield until the end of the nineteenth century.

Captain Higginson, Officiating 2nd-in-Command, directed in Assistant Adjutant-General's letter No. 30, dated 2nd January, rejoined the 1st Punjab Infantry, and struck off the strength of the regiment on the 19th *idem*.

1875

5 January 1875. *Captain T. Higginson, rejoined the 1st Punjab Infantry from the 3rd Sikhs.*

16 January. *The regiment arrives at Dera Ghazi Khan.*

8 February. *Captain T. Higginson, proceeds to Bombay on preparatory leave.*

2 March. *340 Snider Rifles were received for the Regiment and issued to the Left Wing.*



5 July. A day of great sadness as Captain H. W. Pitcher V.C., 2nd-in-Command, Officiating Commandant died this morning. This officer was well liked in the regiment by both officers and men. Captain Higginson and Captain Pitcher would have worked together very closely in all aspects of the life of the regiment.

⇐ *General view of the cantonment including the church, Kohat, near Peshawar in Pakistan, taken by William Henry Baker in 1865. From the British Library Macnabb Collection.*

He was buried at the Garrison Church in Kohat on the North-West Frontier. A Victorian visitor to the church found that the graves there were:

“all brushed and clean and flowers strewn over nearly every one. No end of sepoys came to the

grave of the brave and gallant Captain Pitcher, V.C., and did some act to his honoured memory, or knelt at his grave and breathed a prayer for his soul’s repose.”

Brigade Standing Order No. 3 dated 18th July 1875,

1. The Brigadier General Commanding has to-day received with profound regret, the melancholly intelligence of the sudden death on the morning of the 5th Instant of Captain H. W. Pitcher V. C., 2nd in Command and Officiating Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry.
2. After a long and varied service in Hindustan Captain Pitcher joined the 4th Punjab Infantry in 1859, in time to participate in the Kabool Khail and Mahsood Waziri expeditions (1859-60) and transferred to the 1st Punjab Infantry in 1863. He won at Umbeyla the Victoria Cross by his coolness and daring courage which were the admiration of all spectators (see page 320 G. G. O. 1864)—With equal spirit and determination, he led a Wing of his Regiment to the attack on the village of Gara on the morning of the 25th February 1869 (see Paget’s records page 350).
3. In offering his condolences to the Regiment with which Captain Pitcher had been so long and so honourably associated on the lamentable loss it has sustained, Brigadier General Keyes desires to place on record, the high personal esteem and sincere admiration with which he had watched the career of this gallant officer, and he is sure that these expressions of regret and admiration will be shared in by all his comrades of the Force.

(True Extract)

F. N. MACKENZIE, Major

A. A. G. P. F. F. (Acting Adjutant General Punjab Frontier Force)

Regimental Order No. 514 dated 20th September 1875 (written in England.)

Major Keen Commandant of the Regiment, has heard with the deepest regret of the death of Captain H. W, Pitcher V. G, 2nd in Command, whilst in Officiating Command at Gera Ghuzi Khan. He wishes to express to the Regiment his sense of the terrible loss it has sustained in the lamentable death of that true gentleman and gallant officer. The late Captain Pitcher's services in the field are too well known to the Regiment to require enumeration here. It must be fresh in the memory of many how gallantly he won the Victoria Cross in the Umbeyla Pass and how on all occasions he did his duty as a brave soldier. The loss of this valuable support well long be felt by Major Keen personally, and everyone in the Regiment has to mourn the death of a true friend.

13 August. *Captain Higginson was appointed Wing Commander, 1st Punjab Infantry, on 13 August 1875 after return from leave.*

October 1875: Delhi Camp of Exercise and the Prince of Wales's Visit to India

Roberts, *Forty-one Years in India*, London, Richard Bentley and Son, 1898, p. 326-328

[Page 326]. In October, 1875, I spent some time at Delhi, arranging for the Camp of Exercise to be held there in January for His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. The camp was formed in the beginning of December, and consisted of 17,000 men, in four divisions, commanded by Major-Generals Sir Charles Reid, Macdonnell, the Hon. Arthur Hardinge, and Donald Stewart.

The country round Delhi is particularly well suited for extended manœuvres, and full advantage was taken of the facilities it afforded during the two months the Camp of Exercise lasted. The Prince of Wales landed at Calcutta on the 23rd December; and Lord Napier with his staff went down to meet His Royal Highness, whose reception was loyal and hearty to a degree. As the *Serapis*, with the Prince on board, steamed slowly up the Hughli, salutes were fired from Fort William and three ships of the Royal Navy. All the vessels in the river were gay with flags, their yards were manned, and good hearty English cheers resounded from stem to stern of each ship as the Indian troopship, carrying the heir to England's throne, came in sight. As soon as the *Serapis* was moored, the Viceroy went on board to greet [Page 327] the Prince and conduct His Royal Highness to the gaily-decorated landing-stage, where the principal officials, Native Princes, and chief inhabitants of Calcutta were assembled. Troops lined the road from the river to Government House, and the maidan (the great open space in front) was thronged with a dense crowd of Natives in their most brilliant gala attire, eager to catch a glimpse of the son of the great Queen of England.

1876

That evening Lord Northbrook gave a State banquet. The next day there was a reception of the Princes and Chiefs, followed by a levée, and after dark the whole place was most beautifully illuminated. The week that followed was taken up with entertainments of various kinds—balls, races, and garden-parties, interspersed with official visits—which I am afraid the Prince could not have found amusing—and on New Year's Day, 1876, His Royal Highness held a Chapter of the Order of the Star of India, after which the Commander-in-Chief returned to Delhi to arrange to receive the Prince in that historical city on the 11th January.

His Royal Highness's camp, and that of the Commander-in-Chief, were pitched on the ground occupied by the British army during the siege. The road, five miles in length, from the station to the camp was lined with troops, and on the Ridge itself were placed six Rifle corps, three of which had taken part in the siege¹⁸. The 2nd Gurkhas were very appropriately drawn up immediately under Hindu Rao's house, and when this point was reached, the Prince stopped and warmly complimented the men on the distinguished service the regiment had performed.

The next day there was a parade of all the troops in review order for the inspection of the Prince, who was pleased to express his complete satisfaction and approval of 'the steadiness under arms, soldier-like bearing, and precision of movement, which distinguish the corps of the three armies assembled at the camp at Delhi.'

¹⁸ 60th Rifles, 2nd Gurkhas, and 1st Punjab Infantry

That evening the Prince was present at a ball in the diwan-i-khas (private audience hall) in the palace, given in His Royal Highness's honour by the officers of the army.

The next few days were taken up with manœuvres, which the Prince attended, accompanied by Lumsden³ and myself. The defence was commanded by Reid, the attack by Hardinge, the latter's object being to gain possession of the Ridge, with a view to future operations against the city on the arrival of the main army from the Punjab. But the attack did not meet with the success which attended Barnard in 1857, while the Commander of the defence proved himself as skilful in protecting the Ridge against an enemy advancing from the north as [Page 328] he had been, twenty years before, in repulsing one coming from the opposite direction.

The Prince of Wales held another investiture of the Star of India on the 7th of March at Allahabad, which Lord Napier and the staff attended. At its close we took our leave of His Royal Highness, who started that night for England.

11 October. *The Regiment under the command of Captain A. Vallings, Adjutant commenced its march en route to Delhi Camp of Exercise. On 14 October Captain Vallings was appointed Wing Officer and temporary Commandant.*

Notes on the Delhi Camp of Exercise

The first camp was 15 December 1871- 28 January 1872

The Delhi Camp of Exercise in 1885-1886 was **the largest gathering of troops in peacetime India up to that date**. Four divisions, comprising 14 cavalry and 36 infantry regiments took part and 37,000 troops and 25,000 followers were involved. The exercise included sports as well as military manoeuvres and lasted a month.

14 October. On “14 October 1875 Captain Higginson was appointed to 2nd in Command¹⁹.”

8 December. *The regiment arrived at Naryua Camp, Delhi and joined the 1st Brigade 2nd Division with the 60th Rifles and the 2nd Gurkhas under Command of Brigadier General Sir Charles Brownlow, K.C.B. The 2nd Division was under the Command of Major General Macdonald, C.B.*

1876

11 January 1876. *The Brigade was drawn up on the “Ridge” for the reception of Field Marshall His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.*

Memo of Camp Delhi 24th January 1876.

The Camp of Exercise having broken up Brigadier General Sir Charles Brownlow desires to record the pride and pleasure he has experienced in the Command of the distinguished Regiments which formed his Brigade and which have so well maintained their historic character and the colour of their cloth as Riflemen during the last two months.

The 2-60th Royal Rifles Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel H. P. Montgomery, composed of men in the prime of life, with health, condition and training to fill up the measure of their efficiency, is in his opinion, the perfection of a light infantry battalion. Admirably drilled, equipped and cared for in every respect, the individual intelligence of the soldier developed to the highest extent, with a boundless esprit-de-corps pervading all ranks, it would be difficult to find its equal as an engine of war.

The 2nd Goorkha Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Macintyre V.C., fully upheld its character for careful training, and the quick, quiet and intelligent execution of every task that was imposed upon it, gave evidence of the school of actual service.

The 1st Punjab Infantry, Commanded by Major F. T. Keen, in physique, in soldier-like bearing and spirit, as well as in the

¹⁹ Higginson, p. 40, G.G.O. No. 1037.

rapid, correct, and finished performance of its drill and duty by all ranks, is equal to the highest standard, and can compare in these, respects, no less than in its distinguished reputation in the field with any Regiment in the Native Army of India.

The Brigadier General has never before seen three such Regiments working together, and in taking leave of them “would convey to every officer and man his high appreciation of their merits as good Riflemen^ and wish them all the success which they deserve as such.

(Sd.) C. H. BROWNLOW,
Brigadier General,

Copy of a letter from Major General Macdonell, C. B., Commanding 2nd Division Camp Delhi.

“I was very much gratified in counting in my Division at the Camp at Delhi, and among other Native Corps in the highest

efficiency, the 1st Punjab Infantry. It was equal in every way, in turn out, discipline, and drill, to the best, and in handiness for Field duties and taking advantage of ground, none could come up to it, except the 2nd Goorkhas.

The physique of the men is very fine, and this Battalion has moreover, the advantage of possessing highly intelligent, active and trustworthy officers:—The Native Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, also struck me as particularly fit, and the organization of the corps, was such as to recommend it for employment on service of any kind. Should it ever be my good fortune to be employed hereafter at a Camp of Exercise or on active service, I shall feel secure with troops of such a stamp, under my command.”

3 March. An order of Brigadier General Sir C. Brownlow K.C.B., referring to the Regiment was received and published:

Regimental Order No, 179 doled 3rd March 1876.

In publishing the following Order received from Brigadier General Sir C. Brownlow K.C.B., Commanding 1st Brigade 2nd Division Camp Delhi, the Commanding Officer takes the opportunity of thanking the officers, British and Native, and men for the zealous and cheerful manner in which they performed all the duties at the Camp, and it is a matter of great satisfaction to him to know that their endeavours are highly appreciated by so distinguished a soldier as Sir Charles Brownlow.

7 March. The Regiment marched into Dera Ghazi Khan from Kurrushi; 14 miles and crossed the Indus, and did the march in less than 10 hours, showing the excellent training the men were in. The men had been five months under canvass, marched to Delhi and back a distance of 1050 miles as well as taking part in all the Divisional and Brigade maneuvers and exercises of the Delhi camp of Exercise. The conduct of the men was exemplary, their cheerfulness on the march worthy of all praise and the manner in which they did their work at Camp, elicited the approbation of the highest authorities. (See 3 March 1876 above).

27 June. By Fort St. George Gazette dated 27 June 1876. Captain Theophilus Higginson was promoted Major from 26 June 1876. Major Higginson probably proceeded on leave somewhere around this date. He returns to the Regiment with Major Keen from England on 7 December 1877.

1877

21 March 1877. The Regiment left Dera Ghazi Kan, in route for frontier duty in Quetta (Shal Kot) leaving its Depot at Dera Ghazi Khan. The Route followed was *via* Rajanpur, Bandowali, Bugtidera, Lahri and the Bolan Pass. Byram Khan the son of Emam Bux the Mazari tomandar, accompanied the force as far as Bugtidera, and Shah Baz Khan the tomandar of the Bugtees as far as Lahri.

26 April. The force (1st Punjab Infantry and No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery) reached Quetta having been delayed in Kutchi and the Bolan Pass by bad weather and the necessity of resting the carriage which was beginning to suffer.

27 April. The Right Wing of the Regiment entered the four barracks built by Captain Scott, 4th Sikh Infantry.

7 December. Majors F. J. Keen, Commandant and T. Higginson 2nd-in-Command returned from leave to England and resumes their duties.”

1878

30 January 1878. Captain H. Howell Marched with 2 Companies ‘E’ and ‘H’ for Khelat.

12 June. Major Higginson proceeded with 2 Companies ‘A’ and ‘C’ to relieve Captain Howell and ‘E’ and ‘H’ Companies.

28 June. Captain Howell returned from Khelat.

General Historical Background: The 2nd Afghan War 1878-1880

In 1878-80, British-Indian forces fought a war to ensure that Afghanistan remained free from Russian interference. Although the campaign was eventually brought to a successful conclusion, the British suffered several setbacks in their struggle to control the volatile country.

Throughout the 19th century, the British Government was convinced that the extension of Russian influence over Central Asia constituted a real threat to its Indian domains. This had led Britain to first invade Afghanistan in 1839 with disastrous consequences.

In 1876, the spectre of Russian interference appeared once more when the Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali, was visited by a Russian diplomatic mission. When he then refused to accept a British envoy, the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, decided to act.

In September 1878, Lytton ordered a diplomatic mission to set out for Kabul, where he hoped to establish a political resident. This was a cost-effective way for British India to control the foreign relations of 'buffer' states. When the mission was turned back at the eastern end of the Khyber Pass, the British decided to replace Sher Ali.

On 21 November 1878, three British columns, consisting of 40,000 men, invaded Afghanistan.

One column marched through the Bolan Pass and seized Kandahar. This column, with Major Higginson, had further to go to reach its final objective so they began their advance in early November and would start from Quetta on the 9th in order to be in position to begin the simultaneous advance on the 21st.



⇐ *A rare copper coin minted during the occupation of Kandahar. British Crown within wreath on the obverse, Arabic inscription in four lines on the reverse. These issues were struck under local authorities who routinely recalled and devalued the coppers. This abusive practice led to a great variety of types, often featuring various animal or flower motifs. Accordingly, the types on this coin were likely not ordered by the occupation authorities, but rather placed by an opportunistic engraver eager to please the occupiers. Classical Numismatic Group, Inc. <http://www.cngcoins.com> AFGHANISTAN, Second*

Anglo-Afghan War. Occupation of Qandahar. AH 1296-1298 / AD 1878-1880. Æ Fulus (14.5mm, 4.81 g, 3h). Qandahar mint. Dated AH [129]6 (AD 1878/9). Crown within wreath / Arabic inscription in four lines. SICA 9, 1080; Spencer-Smith, Crown p. 209, fig. 1; Album 3253 note; KM 94. VF, brown surfaces. Rare.

The second column occupied Ali Masjid fortress to secure the Khyber Pass before advancing to Jelalabad.

The third Column advanced along the Kurram Valley towards Kabul. This column, under Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts, found its way blocked at Peiwar Kotal by an Afghan force of 18,000 men and 11 guns. Roberts made a feint attack on the position but led the 5th Gurkha Rifles and other troops in a night flanking movement that dislodged the Afghans. The British-Indian force inflicted heavy casualties and captured all the Afghan guns.

Sher Ali fled from Kabul, only to die of a heart attack soon after. He was succeeded as emir by his son, Yakub Khan, who signed the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879. In return for British support, he accepted the presence of a British envoy, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, and British control of Afghan foreign affairs.

← Major Pierre Louis Napoleon Cavagnari (1841-1879), 1878, Photograph by John Burke, 1878.



Neither the new treaty nor the new emir was very popular in Afghanistan. In September 1879, mutinous Afghan soldiers from Herat appeared in Kabul demanding back-pay from the British. Cavagnari refused their request.

Accompanied by rioting Kabulis, the soldiers attacked and fired the British Residency, killing its 200 occupants, including Cavagnari. Yakub Khan did nothing to intervene.

When news reached India, Roberts was recalled from leave and put in command of a new force. Its mission was to reach Kabul and identify those responsible for the attack. Suspected rebels were to be tried and, if found guilty, executed. Yakub Khan was to be either defeated or deposed as occasion required.

Roberts' force was opposed by the Afghans at Charasiab, despite the fact that Yakub Khan had by then joined the British column. Roberts defeated the Afghan force and reached Kabul in October. Trials and executions began, but supporters of Yakub Khan and opponents of British occupation rose in revolt.



← General Roberts and Sirdars of Kabul, 1879, Photograph by John Burke, 2nd Afghan War (1878-1880), 1879. A sirdar was an Indian term for a chief or nobleman. Burke took this photograph of the Kabul sirdars when he was with General Frederick Roberts' Kabul Field Force which had entered the city in October 1879 following the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his escort. He remained with the soldiers, photographing the city and its inhabitants, until the Field Force's departure in May 1880. NAM. 1955-04-41-59

Several Afghan armies then marched on Kabul. The city had to be abandoned for the more defensible Sherpur Cantonment, situated to the north.

Just before Christmas, around 50,000 tribesmen attacked the 7,000-strong garrison. By dawn on Christmas Eve, the tribes had been dispersed. Roberts then re-occupied Kabul.

In May 1880, Roberts was joined by Lieutenant-General Sir Donald Stewart, who had advanced from Kandahar and defeated an Afghan army at Ahmed Khel.

In July, the vacant throne was offered to Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Sher Ali, who agreed to abide by the terms of the Treaty of Gandamak.

However, trouble was brewing in Herat, where another son of Sher Ali, Ayub Khan, launched his own bid to become emir. On 27 July 1880, a 1,000-strong British-Indian force sent to intercept him was overwhelmed by an army ten times its size at Maiwand. The survivors were pursued back into Kandahar, which was soon besieged by Ayub Khan's victorious army.

In response, Roberts led a force out from Kabul to Kandahar. Despite the difficult terrain and oppressive heat, he covered over 500 km (300 miles) in 20 days, hardly losing a man. On 1 September 1880, he defeated Ayub Khan outside Kandahar and ended the siege.

The British left Afghanistan in the hands of Abdur Rahman, who agreed to conduct his foreign policy through the



Government of India. They also seized several Afghan districts in the Khyber and Kurram border areas. However, the provocative policy of maintaining a British resident in Kabul was quietly dropped. The last British and Indian soldiers left the country in April 1881.

During the 2nd Afghan War the ability of rapid movement and effectively maintained lines of communication were greatly aided by the use of the heliograph. Heliographic communication between mountain stations at higher altitudes for great ranges to clear the curvature of the earth the thinner, clearer air, to maximize distance greatly encouraged much experimentation and development of this means of communication. A good approximation for ranges of 20–50 miles is that the flash of a circular mirror is visible to the naked eye for 10 miles for each inch of mirror diameter, and farther with a telescope. The simple and effective heliograph instrument that Henry Christopher Mance invented would eventually develop into the British Army Mance Mark V version was to be an important part of military communications for more than 60 years. The usefulness of heliographs was limited to daytimes

with strong sunlight, but they were the most powerful type of visual signalling device known. In pre-radio times heliography was often the only means of communication that could span ranges of as much as 100 miles with a lightweight portable instrument. The Punjab Frontier Force would be instrumental in the development of this important means of field communication.

1st REGIMENT PUNJAB INFANTRY.




⇐ These two views of Quetta show the dramatic change in this location from a basically a Camp in 1880 (top photograph) to the Cantonment it would become in 1897 (bottom photograph). The glory of Quetta are the views of the mountains around it; Chahiltan, Murdar and Takatu (the highest between the Himalaya and the Persian Border

The undermentioned officers of the 1st Punjab Infantry served in the war:

Lt.-Colonel F. J. Keen, C.B., commanded the regiment in the first campaign. Commanded the Pishin Moveable Column from 1 January till 3 March, 1879, and the No. 1 Column Thal-Chotiali F.F. from the date of its formation till it was broken up. Effected the night surprise of the Arambi villages, and defeated the enemy at the action of Baghao. (Mentioned in despatches, and thanked in orders; Brevet of Lt.-Colonel; C.B.)


Majors T. Higginson and A. Vallings, Captain L. R. H. D. Campbell, and Lieut. T. C. Pears served with the regiment throughout the period it was employed in the war, taking part in the night surprise of the Arambi villages, and the action of Baghao. All were mentioned in despatches. Captain Campbell was also thanked in orders by Sir I. Stewart for energy displayed in keeping open the line of communications through the Khojak Pass during very severe weather," and commanded the rear-guard which repulsed the enemy's attack on. 21 March 1879. Lieut. Pears acted as Staff Officer to the No. 1 Column, Thal-Chotiali Field Force, and during the



second campaign accompanied Mr. Lepel Griffin, as 3rd Political Assistant, on his special mission to Kabul in February 1880.

Major H. Howell served with the regiment during the campaign.

Lieut. C. B. Brownlow served with the regiment from 22 November till 31 December 1878; with the 2/60th Rifles, (attached), from 1 January till 31 July, 1879, accompanying the battalion in the advance to Kandahar and Kalat-i-Ghilzai; and with the 3rd Goorkhas (attached), from 1 August till 18 October, 1879, accompanying them in the second advance on Kalat-i-Ghilzai.



Captain H. Showers. (Assassinated. See note in the Appendix)²⁰

Specific Services of the 1st Punjab Infantry and Major Higginson: During the 1st Phase of the Second Afghan War 1878-1880²¹

It has been mentioned that the plan prescribed for this invasion was the simultaneous crossing of the frontier by three columns, but a glance at the map will show the differences in the distances that these columns would have to march, to reach the three points of advance assigned to them—the Khyber, the Kurum, and Pishin in front of Quetta. It is clear that to carry out the proper concert in dates, General Biddulph would have to start the advance to Pishin from Quetta before the arrival of the proper commander, Sir Donald Stewart, and of the second division of the force.

Because of the distances involved this column suffered severely from the great distance from its main base of operations at Mooltan, where the depots were formed for the troops, munitions of war and special supplies for

the campaign. Further, the very much greater distance combined with the rough and bare character of the country made the matter of carriage and transport exceptionally serious.

Major Higginson served as second in command of the 1st Punjab Infantry during the first campaign of the Second Afghan War. When Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Keen, C.B., commanded the Pishin Moveable Column from 1 January until 3 March 1879, and the No. 1 Column of the Thal-Chotiali Field Force from 3 March until the end of the war, Major Higginson commanded the Regiment.

Outbreak of the War

On the outbreak of the war the 1st Punjab Infantry was stationed at Quetta, Baluchistan. Forming part of the Division under General Biddulph's command, the regiment crossed the frontier on 20 November 1878, and marched towards the Pishin Valley in Southern Afghanistan.

At the outbreak of war General Biddulph was far from pleased with the maps that were available of Southern Afghanistan commenting, "That the maps of this part of Afghanistan supplied



²⁰ Shadbolt, Sydney H., *The Afghan Campaign of 1878-1880*, London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1882, p. 310-311.


²¹ The details in this section combine information found in Higginson, Theophilus, *Digest of Services of the 1st (Coke's) Regiment Punjab Infantry and An account of the country traversed by the second column of the Thal-Chotiali Field Force in the spring of 1879* by Lieut. R. C. Temple, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c., Bengal Staff Corps; lately attached to the 1st Goorkha Light Infantry. In: *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London* Vol. 49 (1879), p. 190-319, Map facing page 191. London: John Murray. Unfortunately Lieutenant Temple was with the 2nd Column so when the 1st and 3rd Columns separate at Baianai Pass the account is limited.

by the Surveyor- General of India were defective, showing that there was much to explore and many errors to correct²².”

In the southern districts of Afghanistan the Bolan was already a much-used-but still a very much un-mapped-route, and Quetta was already the headquarters of a British resident; but the Afghan war of 1839-42, although it spread into nearly four years of occupation of the country, had not been productive of any great accession to our geographical knowledge of western Afghanistan. There was many an important route along which our soldiers and our guns had travelled which it was impossible to locate exactly on any map existing in 1878, and our knowledge of the topography of the country generally was limited to the immediate neighbourhood of such roads and lines of communication as had been properly traversed. All the more honour then to those energetic officers who kept clear records, and who dared much and did much to dispel the geographical mists which hung over the Afghan hills and valleys²³.

After the capture of Kandahar General Biddulph pushed a reconnaissance to the Helmund river, and employed his survey officers in clearing up some very vague geography in that direction. Never, since that reconnaissance, has any good explorer ever touched Girishk. The Southern Afghan campaigning was indeed productive of an immense amount of valuable mapping both then and sub-sequently, when the stem fighting days of Maiwand and the battle of Kandahar terminated our opportunities of making geography in that part of Afghanistan. Amongst the generals who throughout the course of that much-chequered campaign of two years' duration showed the keenest, most determined interest in clearing away geographical mists, in leaving no stone unturned that might add something to our knowledge of that strange combination of highland, plain, and rugged mountain, which has seen the passage of so many armies holding the destinies of India in their hands, General Biddulph ranked first²⁴.

20 November 1878. Agreeable to Quetta Field Force Order of 19 November the Left Wing of the Regiment under Captain H. Howell marched this morning for Kutteer.



21 November. Agreeable to Quetta Field Force Order, No. 52 of this date the Head Quarters Company of the Regiment will move to Kutteer tomorrow.

23 November. By Brigade Orders, the Regiment marched to Oorumzaie – distance 5 miles.

24 November. Four Companies of the Regiment were ordered out early on the 25th in support of a Reconnoitering party of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the 2nd Sind Horse.

27 November. Agreeable to Division Order No. 84B, dated 20 November the Regiment marched to the village of Huklezaie.

29 November. The Regiment marched to Khush-dil-Khan-ka-Kila.

30 November. Regiment marched to Zmarrai—distance – 8 miles

1 December. The Regiment went out to support the 2nd Punjab Cavalry in a Reconnaissance on the Ghuznee Road.

3 December. The Regiment marched to Huklezaie.

²² General Sir Michael Biddulph's lecture in Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, April 1880.

²³ Holdich, Borderlands, p. 2.

²⁴ Holdich, p. 11.

4 December. The detachment of the Regiment under Command of Major T. Higginson from Kelat joined Head Quarters today.

6 December. Agreeably to Division Order dated 6 December. 'A.' Company under Command of Major T. Higginson marched in the direction of Lora Nullah.

7 December. Major A. Vallings reported his arrival.

9 December. Agreeably to B. O., dated 8 December. 1878, the Regiment marched 8 ½ miles in the direction of Arumbi Karoz.

10 December. Agreeably to B. O. No. I of 9 December 1878, the Regiment marched to Abdulla-Khan-ka-klla.

11 December. Agreeably to B. O. No. II of 10 December 1878, the Regiment marched to Abdulla-Khau-ka Ghuree.

12 December. The Regiment marched to the top of the Kojak (Khojak) Pass.

15 December. The Regiment marched to Chammmn - Distance 6 miles.

19 December. Lieutenant O. E. Henderson reported his arrival.,

22 December. On account of the desertion of some sepoy, the Regiment was ordered back to Kojak B. O. No. I, dated 22 December 1878. Captain L. R. H. Campbell reported his arrival and joined the Regiment.

23 December. The Regiment marched to Abdula Khan-ki-Ghuree, 'G.' and 'H.' Co., remained behind under Captain Campbell.

26 December. Agreeable to Division Order No. I, dated 25 December on Company of the Regiment consisting of 2 Native Officers, 6 N.C.O.'s and 63 Rank and File, marched to Quetta as escort to one division Bombay Mountain Battery to that station and then escort 2 guns Punjab Mountain Battery to Gulistan Karez to join the Pishin Movable Column.

27 December. One Company of the Regiment (1 British Officer, 2 Native Officers, 7 N.C.O.'s and 80 Rank and File) under the Command of Captain Campbell, marched to Camp Rojak to take up winter Quarter there.

30 December. Agreeable to B. O. No. I, dated 29 December, two Companies of the Regiment under the Command of Major A. Vallings, went out reconnoitering.

31 December. Agreeable to B. O. dated 30 December the Regiment marched to Gulistan Karez.

Agreeable to B. O. dated 30 December one Native Officer and 20 Rank and File, started to relieve a similar detachment of the 2nd Beluch Regiment at Huklezaie.

1879

1 January 1879. Lieutenant Brownlow joined the 60th Rifles for a period of 6 months to learn his duty.

8 January. During the night of the 8th a guard with 3 Sepoys under the Command of Naik Davi Sahai at Arabi Karez was attacked by 30 or 40 of the enemy. Two Sepoys were killed, and one carried off as a prisoner. The Naik escaped. After investigation he was reduced to the ranks for slackness on duty by orders of Lieutenant General Stewart. It was discovered that the 25 Cavalry that should have accompanied this guard were withdrawn without any. Intimation being given. The small guard was left in a very exposed position, and consequently cut up.

9 January. During the night of the 9th at Kila Abdulla, Subadar Fyziulab with 35 men of the Regiment, returning from escorting a convoy to Chummun was attacked by 300 Atchakzais. The subadar had heard that he was likely to be attacked and had made most excellent arrangements to meet it.

The enemy attacked vigorously 3 or 4 times in the night, which was met with the utmost steadiness by the men and the enemy were eventually driven off, leaving 4 of their dead, almost on the bayonets of the men. The Subadar reported well of the behavior of the men, and he also speaks in the highest praise of the Kahars who accompanied the detachment.



Subadar Fyziulab for his coolness, judgement and arrangements during the fight he received the 1st Class of the Order of Merit, as a very special reward from the Government. At the time he was not in possession of either the 3rd or 2nd Class of the Order.

← *Indian Order of Merit, 1st Class*

12 January. During the night of the 12th the Regiment forming part of the Pishin Movable Column, under Major F. J. Keen marched to the Arumbi Valley, to surprise the Kakazaies, who had taken a prominent part in the attacks of 8 and 9 January. The surprise was successful, and the villages of the offenders were destroyed, and after doing all the damage possible, the Regiment returned to Kila Abdolla at 5:30 P.M., on the 13th, having marched 32 miles.

The results of the expedition were the complete submission of the Atchakzai and Kakazai Mullicks, the restoration of all Government property taken away from Arumbi Karez, and the recovery of the prisoner taken from the Guard, destroyed at that place.

18 January. The Regiment marched to Gulistan Karez.

The Thull-Chotiali Field Force

Richard Bruce, C.I.E., former Political Agent of Beluchistan and Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division in the Punjab sets up the setting and purpose of the Thull-Chotiali Field Force²⁵:

“As everything had settled down quietly and peacefully under General Stewart at Kandahar, and there appeared to be no prospect of further resistance or trouble in that quarter, the Government of India determined to withdraw a portion of the Kandahar Field Force. The garrison of Kandahar was accordingly fixed at six thousand men, and it was ordered that General Biddulph should return to India with the remainder of the force. It was further arranged, on Major Sandeman’s recommendation, that the General should march by the new route via Thall-Chotiali to the Punjab. Major Sandeman accompanied the force himself, and in order to afford him every facility for dealing with the Kakars he was furnished with a strong escort²⁶, and made a detour through the Baghao valley. Here he was opposed by a strong Kakar laskkar (force) led by Sirdar Shahjehan of Zhob. After a brisk fight the Kakars were completely defeated.

²⁵ Bruce, Richard I., *Forward Policy and its Results*, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1900, p.94.

²⁶ The escort, which was the 1st Column of the Thull-Chotiali Field Force commanded by Major F. S. Keen (now General Sir F. S. Keen, K.C.B.).

No.	Mountain.	Approximate Elevation in Feet.
1	Takatu'	11,500
2	Mangal	9,000
3	Zarghu'n	10,500
4	Pil	9,000
5	Chappar	8,500
6	Kand	10,500
7	Ma'zhwo	11,000
8	Surghwand	10,500
9	Spinslekar	10,000
10	Surlo'	10,500
11	Mat'hilar	10,000
12	Sya'gai	9,000
13	Na'via't	9,500

After this the force met with no further opposition. General Biddulph marched through the Bori and Chemalang valleys, and Major Sandeman through Thall-Chotiali to Barkhan, where he joined the main body, and all returned via Fort Munro to the Punjab after a very successful march, in which an immense amount of useful information about the country and tribes was collected."

← *Heights of Mountains: Many of the mountains rise to a considerable elevation, but the heights stated in the accompanying list were guessed at by Lt. Temple on the spot from such data as could be obtained.*

Looking eastwards from the Pishin, there is a grand and striking view of the series of mountain-ranges commencing from Mt. Chiltan on the south, and thence running past Mts. Takatu, Zarghun, Pil, and Chappar, to Mt. Kand on the north. Mt. Takatu

is a fine mountain from any point of view, as also is Mt. Mazhwo, of which a grand view is obtained from Shudand in the River Rod Gorge. Mt. Surghwand is likewise a fine and striking mountain from the north.

There is also a very fine view from the Nangaluna Pass over the Shor Yalley and Ghobargai country, the Chimjan Ghar Peak and Mt. Syajgai presenting a remarkable appearance, and there is a pretty view towards the Sberkai Peak and Kohar Hills from Baianai. But with these exceptions the country is too bare and broken up into small points to be striking or pretty. Mt. Syajgai, an isolated square-topped peak, in the middle of the Shor Yalley near Chimjan, is here a remarkable object from all points; but it would not be so in India generally, where there are many like it in all parts of the country from Rajputana to Mysore.

In regard to the conduct of the operations, the following instructions were issued for guidance. The examination will embrace—

- I. A general survey.
- II. Careful consideration with reference to the construction of a military road and railway.
- III. Examination of routes with reference to the movement of troops.
- IV. Choice of a suitable site in a commanding position at a proper elevation, well supplied with food and water for a standing military post.

Position territorially to be subordinate to the above considerations.

The 1st Punjab Regiment formed part of No. 1 Column (Major F. J. Keen), of the Thull-Chotiali Field Force, Commanded by Major General Michael Anthony Shrapnel Biddulph, CB

2 March 1879

The Thull-Chotiali Field Force was composed of three columns. The whole force was commanded by Major General Biddulph, C.B. The objective of this Field

Force was to open a direct march and supply route to Dera Ghazi Khan through Afghan territory largely un-explored by Military Survey.

The Thull-Chotiali Field Force

Headquarter Staff.

- Major-General Sir M. A. Biddulph, R.A., commanding.
- Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant S. F. Biddulph, 34th Regiment.
- Colonel J. Browne, R. E., Political Officer.
- Major G. B. Wolseley, (65th Foot, A.A.G.)
- Captain R. M. Stewart, R.A., A.Q.M.G.
- Deputy Surgeon-General J. Hendley, A.M.D., P.M.O.
- Captain W. G. Nicholson, R.E., Field Engineer.
- Captain W. J. Heaviside, R.E. Survey Department
- Captain T. H. Howick, R.E. Survey Department
- Captain W. Luckhardt, Bombay Staff Corps, Principal Commissariat Officer.
- Lieutenant W. G. Smith, 70th Foot, Signals.

Lieutenant J. J. Money-Simons, 24th Punjab Native Infantry, Transport.

ITINERARY from KALA ABDULLAH KHAN.

No.	Stage.	Miles.	Total Miles.
1	Badwa'n	6	..
2	A'h'zai	12½	18½
3	Khu'shdil Kha'n	11	29½
4	Sharan Ka're'z	6½	36
5	Balozai Ka're'z	8½	44½
	1st excursion to Gwa'l, 10 miles.		
	2nd excursion, Gwa'l to A'madu'n, 14½ miles.		
6	I'saf Kach	9½	53¾
7	Ispira Ra'gha	16	69¾
8	Khwa'ra	13½	83¾
9	Chimja'n	6½	89¾
	3rd excursion towards Zho'b Valley, 8 miles.		
10	Baia'nai	22	111¾
11	Ninga'nd	9½	121¼
12	Waria'gai	12½	133¾
13	Sharan	16	149¾
14	Hanumba'r Pass	12	161¾
15	Trikh Kuram Pass	18½	180¼
16	Tsamalang	16	196¼
17	Ba'la Dha'ea	11	207¼
18	Mitthi Khu'i'n	16	223¼
19	Luga'ri' Ba'rkh'an	12½	235¾

Column No. 1 began the march as the lead column.

1st Column

Major F. J. Keen, 1st Punjab Infantry. Major G. U. Prior, D.A.Q.M.G. Captain H.F. Showers, Transport Officer.
1 Squadron, 8th Bengal Cavalry.
1 Squadron, 2nd Sind Horse.
2 guns, Jacobabad Mountain Battery.
2 guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.
1st Punjab Native Infantry (400 men).

2nd Column

Colonel R. S. Hill, 1st Ghoorkas. Major H. H. F. Gifford, 13th Hussars, Brigade Major.
15th Hussars.
32nd Pioneers.
1st Ghoorkas.
2 guns, Peshawar Mountain Battery.

With this column the headquarters of the force marched as follows ,-

3rd Column.

Brigadier-General T. Nuthall, Bombay Staff Corps. Captain W. W. Haywood, 14th Foot, Brigade Major.
2 squadrons 8th Bengal Cavalry.
6 companies 70th Foot.
1 company Sappers.
1 wing 12th Bengal Native Infantry.

Dera-Ghazi-Khan to Leghari Barkhan Column.

Commanding, Colonel Prendergast. Political Officer, Mr. H. Fryer, Deputy Commissioner, Dera-Ghazi-Khan.
2½ squadrons 15th Bengal Cavalry.
400 21st Madras Native Infantry.
200 30th Madras Native Infantry.
100 Rawalpore Contingent.

This column left Dera-Ghazi-Khan on 23 February, and reached Vatakri on 6 March. On the 30th, Colonel Prendergast marched, attended by Mr. Fryer, by the Hun Pass, to meet Major Keen and Major Sandeman. The column was threatened but was not attacked. The march of the 2nd Column on the 2nd to Annum bar effectually checked the intended hostile movement of the tribes.

Death Roll of Officers.

Lieutenant Willis, R.A., Kandahar, assassinated.
Captain Reynolds, 3rd Sind Horse, in action, Kishki Nakhud.
Colonel Fellowes, 32nd Pioneers, dysentery, Hun Pass.
Colonel Nicholetts (subsequently), 2nd Baluchis.


3 March. *Regiment marched to Kila Abdolla (Kala Abdullah Khan).*

Kala Abdullah Khan, 5,600 feet, is a village at the entrance to the Khojak (Kojak) Pass from the Pishin side to S. of the pass. It is the residence of Mir Aslam Khan, Abdali, the Sirdar, or chief, of the Achakzai section of the Duranis. He is the son of the late Mir Abdullah Khan. The village is not large, say twenty houses, though it has the

appearance of being so on account of the serai or fort Mir Aslam Khan has built by it. There are some trees and a garden in this upon which the Sirdar has spent, he says, Rs. 2,000. The arable land between the Khojak stream and the village is said to be a jagir and rent-free.

The crops grown hereabouts are wheat, barley, millet, Indian com (maize), and lucerne.

There is a large space for an encampment alongside the Khojak stream (about a mile from the village), which has here a broad stony bed like most mountain rivers, through which the river winds in several streams. At this time of the year, winter, the stream at this part is small, but clear and sweet, with a fast current. The drawbacks as an encamping-ground are that the place is liable to violent winds and dust-storms, and in the winter, there is some danger of being snowed in. Wood is scarce in the district, and the local supply is soon used up if a force has to halt in bad weather. There is a view N.E. into the Pishin through the entrance of the pass, but it is not extensive. Mount Takatu, 10,500 feet, is visible across the valley. There is considerable cultivation along the hillslopes.



4 March. Regiment marched to Allazai (Alizai), 18 miles. General forward march line to Badwan bearing 86° and from Badwin to Alizai bearing 90°.

The road leads right through the Khojak River in its several beds altogether for about ½ mile, then over some uncultivated lands for about 4 miles to Rahamdil Khan's village, and then through the Arambi stream, after which it passes a series of water channels, or torrent-beds, for 2½ miles to Badwan.

From Badwan to Alizai the road runs mainly through light sandy soil at the foot of the hills to the N. of the Pishin for about 10 miles, but for the last 2 miles, it goes through torrent-scoured country, where it is stony and covered with detritus. In parts it is broken by water washing through the soil and creating irregularities in the surface, and it crosses several small nullahs with hard sandy bottoms and steep difficult banks. In fine weather the road is good, easy and pleasant, but heavy and troublesome for baggage-animals after rain or in bad weather, especially in the stream-beds or broken ground, where the soil is liable to become quicksand in places. Opposite Badwan the River Chor runs a few hundred yards to the s. of the road. Here its channel is very deep, and its banks impracticable except by ramping. About 5 miles out, to N., a mile distant from the road, are the ruins of Sayad Salo, a large village, the inhabitants of which have removed to the Quetta district. At 6 miles out, the road passes Sayad Paind, 5 miles s. of which lies Karbela, whose inhabitants claim to be Sayads, but are disowned by them. The Karbelas seem to be a sept apart, for neither Tarins, Kakra's, Duranis or Sayads care to own them. About a mile off the road to N. lie three villages in quick succession, Hajizi, Shahdad, and Gauri, the first two are Sayad and the latter an Alizai (Tor Tarin) village. Two bad nullahs are passed just before reaching Sayad Paind and the River Chor shortly afterwards. The villages about here lie pretty thick, and the land is extensively cultivated. After passing Gauri the road goes through a graveyard, in which is a mound with a Sayad Pir's (saint's) tomb on the top of it. His name was Ajaiab. Shortly after this it runs past Ajabzai, a Sayad village: to the S. of this, about ½ mile distant, is a copse or enclosure of trees, said to have been the residence of Ajaiab, the Pir above mentioned. Here also to the N., about 4 miles distant, and close under the hills, are visible the huts of some Kakars of the Suliman Khel section. The road next passes the Alizai (Tor Tarin) village of Sayamzai, and finally, after crossing a bad nullah, reaches Alizai (Tor Tarin) itself, about a mile further on. All the villages, especially Shahdad, are large for Afghan villages, and appear to be well-

to-do. The inhabitants have a more civilised appearance than I have yet seen elsewhere, and seem well disposed towards us. A great number speak Hindostani.

Alizai, 5,500 feet, is a large well-to-do Tor Tarin village. The supplies were plentiful, principally as before, but the prices were much more reasonable. Bullocks, horses, camels, were offered for sale. I saw also large quantities of sheep and goats and donkeys grazing, and near Alizai plenty of cattle.

The country about looks fertile and is a good deal under cultivation. The natural vegetation noticeable along the route are tamarisk, southernwood, moss, camelthorn, the onion-like weed above mentioned, and a mossy shrub with a long flower-stem to it. Trees also seem more plentiful than usual, and here and there near the villages are some fine ones. Near Alizai there is an interesting series of asyas (watermills) along the line of a stream, which is raised by embankments at the head of each asya, and then shot down into it by a wooden shoot. These mills are well worked and pay a tax yearly to the Ameer's Government.

A fine and clear view of the peaks above mentioned, Chiltan, Takatu, Zarghun, Pil, Chappar and Kand is obtained here, all lying to the S. and E., and at this time of year all snow-clad: to the N. runs a low line of volcanic hills about 4 miles distant. Up to these the glacia above mentioned is longer and more marked than usual. Alizai lies on the slope, and from it, accordingly, an extensive view of the Pishin is obtained.

5 March. *Regiment marched to Kush-dil-Khan (Khushdil Khan), 11 miles. General forward march line to Khushdil Khan bearing 110°.*

The road at first runs through light sandy soil, more or less covered with debris and scored by the rains. After about a mile it crosses the River Toghai in its several branches, all of which have stony bottoms and no banks to speak of, and the water is about ankle-deep. At 4 miles it crosses the River Muzarai, a similar stream in all respects. At this point the hills to the n. of the Pishin approach to within a mile of the road, and the country is much water-washed and stony. The road then passes through a much-broken country intersected by deep nullahs, which would give a good deal of trouble in wet weather, as far as the 9th mile, where it crosses the River Lora. The soil in the broken land is clayey, and in wet weather slippery and bad for animals. At the point where the River Lora is crossed the river has low and easy banks and a stony bottom. Its bed is about 50 yards broad, and the stream knee-deep. After this the road passes over a stony water-scoured country, and crosses several streams and torrent-beds, the water about ankle-deep, for about a mile, when the River Barso is reached—here of a similar nature and depth to the River Lora—and a mile further on, through cultivated fields, lies Khushdil Khan. As may be supposed, the road winds a good deal, but its general direction is E.S.E. It may be pronounced to be bad in anything but very fine and dry weather and would always be troublesome for baggage- animals or wheeled carriages. It is, however, the best line to take, running as it does as near the hills as practicable, for all the streams, which are here shallow with low banks, very soon cut deep into the sandy and clayey soil formed by the wash from the hills, and become formidable streams, with high overhanging banks, impracticable without ramping, while the land about them is much broken and cut into by the annual rains. There is a short cut from Alizai to Khushdil Khan by the village of Bagarzai, but it is not a desirable route on this very account.

The villages are numerous about this part of the valley, which is thickly populated. The country passed through is similar to that previously described, and its natural products and crops the same. The ground near the hills is uncultivated except in patches, but there is extensive cultivation along the line of villages, except in the broken ground, which is quite bare. Water is stored in small irrigation-tanks in places, and karez and asyas are visible everywhere. There is a newly-dug karez running between Dab Khanizai and Samazai, the wells of which are very deep, small and well dug. Sheep, goats and donkeys are to be seen all along the hills, and about Khushdil Khan cattle in quantities. There are trees about the villages and pistachio-trees along the hill-slopes to the E. of Khushdil Khan, otherwise the country is bare. The people in route appear, as before, to be well-to-do, speak Hindostani to a great extent, and have travelled a good deal.

Khushdil Khan 5,600 feet, is now an empty fort, partially ruined. It is built in the usual way and is about 100 yards square. It was from this that the Ameer's naib (lieutenant), Nur Mohammad Khan, Barakzai, governed, but he fled on our approach, and the place is now used as a Government godown (warehouse), in charge of another Nur

Mohammad Khan, a Belocli, in our employ. The supplies now collected are of all sorts, and very plentiful; but the prices are very high. A road from this leads, via Noa Bazar (Batazai, Tor Tarin), to Quetta, and one is said to lead, via the villages of Mehtarzai and Khunjagai, through a pass near Mt. Kand to the Zhob valley. Khush-dil-Khan is said to be the site of a proposed British cantonment. Water, as usual here, is plentiful and good. There is a view over the valley to Mt. Khwaja Amran and the Gwaja Pass.

8 March. Captain Campbell with the Kojak detachment returned to Head Quarters (See Appendix X)


11 March. Regiment marched to Sharin Karez (Sharan Karex), 7 miles. General forward march line to Sharin Karez (Sharan Karex) bearing 108°.

The road leads past the village of Kamalzai (Tor Tarin)—over a detritus strewn country at an easy upward gradient, towards the hills to N. E. of the Pishin for about 3 miles, something S. of E., after which it turns northwards for a mile, bearing 75°. During this mile it crosses several torrent-beds, and is somewhat hilly. After this it follows the line of the River Sharan, in an easterly direction. At its entrance the gorge of the river is about 300 yards wide, but it rapidly narrows to about 80 yards, and at half-a-mile from the entrance the road descends into the river-bed, which is hard and stony. The hills on either side are not high, say 250 feet in the highest part, and are composed mostly of a soft slaty and shaly rock. The bed is narrow in places, not more than 20 yards wide, so that camels or baggage-animals, and all wheeled carriages, would have to go in single file. The river itself is usually an insignificant stream, and there are no signs of its ever becoming a formidable torrent. The road up it winds a good deal, but the upward gradient is not great. At about a mile from the camping-ground the road leaves the river-bed and goes over a small kotal (pass); from this to the camp the gradient is steepish, but the ground is firm. Such a road must, from its nature, be impracticable during wet weather, but the stream would soon run down after heavy rains. It would be easy to find a line for a good road practicable in any weather along the river-side. No villages, or even huts, are met with alter Kamalzai.

Sharan Karez is at 6,300 feet. There is no village here, and no huts for some distance off the road. The hills are inhabited by Kakars, of the Suliman Khe1, Amand Khel, Panizai, and Shamozai sections, who do not here live in villages, and all their huts are removed some distance from the road for reasons of safety. The Karez was the property of Sayad Mulla Khalakdad whose ziarat (tomb) is near Khush-dil-Khan, and now belongs to the Tarin zamindars (landowners) of that neighbourhood; beyond this point it belongs to the kakars. There are several narrow, deep wells in it, and the water is good. The camping-ground is hilly and on broken ground, but the space is fair and the soil dry; it is, however, liable to high winds. The mam range of the hills is about 3 miles to the E., but points near camp, for picquets, can easily be found, effectually overlooking the country. There is a fine view over the Pishin from many nearby points. A mountain path leads to Barshor to the N. in the country about Mt. Kand. Supplies are fair.

The country passed through as far as the gorge of the River Sharan is much as before; cultivation near the villages round Khush-dil-Khan, and then stony water-scoured country, crossed by many small torrent-beds, and cultivated only in patches in the hollows. At this time of year, March, some of the wheat was about 6 inches high. The southernwood and camelthorn are thick, and the camel-grazing, consequently, is here plentiful and good. Barbary bushes may also be seen pretty thick in some of the torrent-beds. In the river gorge, glass, both fine and coarse, and reeds are to be found, especially about the damp ground, caused by the frequent springs in its neighbourhood. Wheat is also grown about the river wherever practicable. After the kotal the country is very broken, but the natural products are the same as before, and even in these hills wheat and barley cultivation is largely carried on by means of kuls, or artificial watercourses. Cattle and sheep are to be seen grazing on the lower slopes. Trees are scarce, but a few pistachio-trees are to be seen about the hills. The climate is not particularly pleasant, but not unhealthy. Now, i.e., in the spring, the sun is hot in the daytime, but frequently a bitterly cold wind blows, and at night there is a hard frost. In wet and cloudy weather it is very cold, with rain in the valleys and snow on the hills, above 6,000 feet. These remarks apply to the n. of the Pishin generally; the eastern slopes of the Khojak are much warmer.

12 March. Regiment marched to Bulazai (Balozi Karez), 8 miles. At the 2nd mile was a stiff Kotah, a road over which had been made very good, by a Company of the Regiment under Subadar Fyztulab. General forward march line to Bulazai (Balozi Karez) bearing 96°.



The road leads towards the Surai Pass, general forward bearing, 108° , at first through very wild and broken country, with sharp ascents and descents in rapid succession, but after a few hundred yards it follows the flat pebbly bed of a mountain-stream, the River Surai, which is about 70 to 100 yards wide with a general bearing of 110° from Sharan Karez. The gradient is at first easy but after about a mile the ascent becomes considerable and very trying for baggage-animals, and the river-bed gradually narrows to 30 yards after 2 miles, and to 15 yards after $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The stream is usually dried up, only a little water being found trickling in places from springs in its bed. At one point, $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from where the road enters the nullah-bed, a short zigzag with a 12-foot road, has been recently made, to avoid a narrow place which is only 4 feet wide. After this the road in the stream is the reverse of good, being 5 to 13 yards wide, with a considerable ascent. At about half-a-mile from the top of the Surai Pass, which is reached in $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Sharan Karez a very winding zigzag has been recently constructed, at a fair gradient, with a 5-foot road. The ascent over the pass is about 300 feet. The descent into the Dof Valley is at first very rapid and winding down a recently made road²⁷ and then for a mile down the bed of another stream, also called the River Surai which is similar in all respects to its namesake on the Pishin side. The general bearing forward of the descent is about 167° , or nearly S.E. At the point where the stream debouches on to the valley the road to Balozai Karez turns northwards across the Dof Valley (general forward bearing, 80°) till the village is reached about 4 miles further on across the River Surkhab; here a dry insignificant torrent-bed, about 50 yards wide, with a stony bottom and banks from 2 to 5 feet high, easy and practicable in any weather. The road as at present used is one only practicable in fine weather, but there is nothing great in the natural difficulties of the pass, and a little engineering, should render it an easy one and always practicable.

A bridle-path leads from Sharan Karez to Saghai, over a hill about 300 feet higher than the Surai Pass, capable of being rendered practicable for troops. Another bridle-path leads from the bottom of the zigzag in the Surai Pass to Lur Angang, and another again from that place to Noa Bazar in the Pishin, via the Kharzangai Pass. A main road leads S. from the Dof Valley to Quetta, via Zharghhun Karez and Khushlak, and another N. to the Zhob valley, via Khunchagai on the slopes of Mt. Kand. And lastly there is a cattle-track near the village of Shakar into the Pil country to S.E.

²⁷ Lieutenant Temple believes all the roads were constructed by Captain H. L. Wells, R.E. who on the outbreak of the war raised and commanded the Ghilzai Coolie Corps and was mainly employed in constructing roads through the Gazaband and Khojak Passes. Commanded the 33 sabres Sind Horse and Punjab Cavalry which surprised the camp of the marauder Lushka Khan and killed him and his nephews. (Wounded.) He was attached, as a Survey Officer, in command of the Ghilzais, to the 1st Column Thal-Chotiali F.F., and during the return march by the new route to India was present at the action of Baghao. During the second campaign served from January 1880, with the Khyber Force, accompanying, as Aide-de-Camp and D.A.Q.M.G., General Gib's expedition against the Shinwaris in May, 1880, and being present at the action of Mazina, and in June, 1880, taking part in the Kama expedition. (Three times mentioned in despatches.)

The country about the Surai Pass is very wild and broken, composed principally of a series of conical hills, of a soft shaly and slate rock, which disintegrates on contact with the air. The overgrowths are southernwood, camelthorn, and coarse grass in tufts, and dwarf tamarisk and barbary bushes are to be found in the river-beds; some Sharwa'n or Shnai (? pistachio) trees also grow on the hills, and I saw one cherry-tree. Towards the summit of the pass there are some olive-trees, a fragrant bush, something like broom in appearance, and a plant like a dwarf holly.

At the top of the pass there is a fine view over the Pishin, but no cultivation is to be seen anywhere about it.

The Dof Valley is an upland valley at a great elevation, 6,500 feet. It is about 15 miles long by about 8 miles broad, and its general direction is from N.N.E. to S.S.W. It is closed at its S. end by the gorge of the River Surkhab, and at its northern end by some low hills. The valley is drained by the River Surkhab, into which run two smaller streams, the River Rod and the River Narin. The remarkable glacis visible in the Pishin is also to be observed here, and the water-scour is also considerable. Cultivation by means of kuls and karezes is carried on by the river-banks and in the hollows as usual. Wheat, millet, Indian corn, and barley are the crops grown. Where not cultivated, the country is bare of trees, except about the villages, and covered over with a thick growth of camelthorn and southernwood. The soil is light, sandy, and friable, and not nearly so good as in the Pishin. Karezes are especially numerous, being dug to a considerable depth, and there seems to be no lack of water. Sheep and goats and cattle are plentiful, and supplies of the ordinary kind obtainable everywhere.

The valley is well populated; the number of villages being no less than twenty, but none of them are large, excepting Balozai Karez and Khanizai Karez. All the inhabitants are Kakars, and appear quiet and well-to-do, despite their bad name, excepting those about the Surai Pass, who have a poverty-stricken appearance. The villages are, going up the valley from the S., Kuzangang, Lurangang, Mohammad Sharif, Kshoi Krez, Zarghun Karez, Shakar, Khanizai Karez, Mekhan, Saghai, Shamawan, Balozai Karez, Wochakhla, Dewad, Dilshor, Murghai, Narin, Tlarai, Bargai, Tlarai (2), and Kahan.

A view of Mts. Kand and Takatu is to be obtained anywhere in the valley, and also of Mt. Surghwand, an isolated peak to the E.

The climate at this time of the year, spring, is pleasant, the thermometer ranging from 75° in the day to 25° at night, and the cold wind of the Pishin is shut out by the surrounding hills.

Balozai Karez, 6,600feet, is a Kakar village, of the Panizai. section, and is situated in the centre of the valley on the River Rod, near some low isolated hills. It is of some size. Supplies are of the usual kind and plentiful, prices being high, as elsewhere in this part of Afghanistan, though not so high as placed by the political authorities. The camping-ground is about a mile from the village, on the slopes of a low hill. The space is large and the natural drainage good; water is near, plentiful, and good.

14 March. Regiment marched to Usaf Kutch (Isaf Kach), 9½ miles. General forward march line to Usaf Kutch (Isaf Kach) bearing 108°.

The road runs along the bed of the River Rod for a mile-and-a-half, the bed of which is broad and stony, but the stream usually insignificant. It then goes through some cultivated land for about a mile, when it enters the hills, after which it is good and clearly marked, but the ascent is steepish, about 34°. At about 31 miles a small gap in the hills is reached, and the road follows the bed of another stream, the River Zadun for 2 miles. It is winding and stony, but nowhere difficult, though the ascent is again considerable. After this a graveyard and some huts, at a place called Mosai, are reached, being the highest point on the road, which then descends again to the bed of the River Rod, running over undulating sandstone hills for 2 miles. The river is here still broad, but the stream is small and the banks easy. After this the road either follows the river-banks or its bed to the camping-ground, which is about half-a-mile beyond the village of Isaf Kach. The gradient of the bed of the River Rod is about 1 in 80. There are no engineering difficulties on this road, and, considering the mountainous nature of the country traversed, it is good, and, excepting that the rivers passed through are liable to floods, it should be passable at any time.

There is nothing fresh to be noticed about the country passed through in the Dof Valley. The villages passed en route were Dilshor (Bazai, Kakar) and Dewad (Mehtarzai, Kakar). After the hills are entered, the country is hilly, but not particularly broken. The soil and hills are mostly composed of soft clayey shale. The overgrowths are as usual, and there are no trees. In the gorge of the River Zadun, varying in width from 100 to 800 yards, the country is broken, and the hills somewhat bare, their appearance being very much that of those in Sagar, above described, and the same remarkable occurrence of red, yellow, and grey clays is to be observed. There are a few trees about. At and after Mosai the hills as far as the River Rod become undulating, and are apparently of sandstone, and trees become more plentiful. Up to this point no cultivation is to be seen after the hills are entered. The gorge or valley of the River Rod is about half-a-mile broad, the country here becoming mountainous rather than hilly. There is considerable cultivation apparently of wheat and Indian corn, along the river-side by means of kuls. The principal points noticeable are the trouble taken to keep the river in its place by means of stone groins and walls, and the planting of willows along these, by which means arable land is reclaimed from the river; and the change in the structure of the houses. The walls are of mud over stone from the river-bed, and the roof is of thatch, plastered over with mud. Their appearance is much rougher than that of the huts in the Pishin. There are a good many fruit-trees (apricots and plums) about the villages, and trees on the hill-sides. The villages passed are Isaf Kach (Shamozai, Kakar) and Kosh Kach (Bazai, Kakar), near each other. They are not large.

Isaf Kach camping-ground, 7,400 feet, is in a wide place in the gorge of the river, overlooked by high hills. There is room for about a brigade. The soil is sandy, but the natural drainage is good. A road runs from this point up the River Pinakai, via Amadun and Sagar, to Quetta. From the hills at the back of the camp a view southwards of Mts. Takatu, Mangal, Zarghun, and Mazhwo is to be obtained. Mt. Pil is not far to the S., and a peak is pointed out as Chapar, to the S., but this is doubtful. Mt. Surghwand is to be seen to the E. and Mt. Kand to the N. The inhabitants are all Kakars, principally of the Sarangzai section.

15 March. Regiment marched to Ispira Raghā, 15¼ miles. Ascended to a height of 8,100 feet. The weather snowed most of the way. General forward march line to Ispira Raghā bearing 116°.

Shortly before reaching Camp; one Company under Command of Major Vallings accompanied Major Sandeman {Governor General's Agent for Baluchistan) and Major Keen to parley with a number of men on the surrounding hills who did not know what to make of the troops.

After following them for some distance, their fears were conquered, and they came in. These were inhabitants of the country.

The road follows the winding bed of the River Rod almost as far as the Ush Kotal, 12 miles. Its general direction is here easterly, but there are two sharp turns to the S. at the 4th and 7th miles. The river-bed is stony, but nowhere difficult, and the stream insignificant. The gorge of the stream is at first about 800 yards wide, narrowing to 400 yards at the 7th to the 8th mile, and the hills on either side lofty. At the 10th mile the hills and the river begin to disappear, and the country to get more open. As the Ush Pass is neared, the road, passes through a lumpy somewhat broken country, but is easy. As far as this the road in ordinary weather is, for a mountain-road, easy and good, the ascent being slight, about 1 in 65. The ascent of the kotal is short and not difficult. When this is crossed, the descent is somewhat sharp down the bed of a narrow mountain-stream, the River Ush, which the road follows for a mile and then runs for two miles down the bed of the River Ikhbarg southwards at a considerable incline. The river-bed is stony, and about 100 yards broad, and the streams light. After about 3½ miles from the Ush Pass, the Ispira Raghā plateau is seen to the right, almost due W., and a detour from the road onwards, which runs nearly due E., is made for half-a-mile to obtain a camping-ground. The road is nowhere difficult, being hilly only at the Ush Pass, and at the points between the River Ush and the River Ikhbarg. Guides, however, are necessary, as it would be by no means easy to find the way without them, and wrong turns might easily be taken in the Rod gorge as well as in the more open hilly country above it. It should be remembered that the River Rod is liable to floods over 6 ft. deep, and that the River Ikhbarg also bears signs of being deeply flooded at times. Good water is plentiful everywhere, being wanting only for a mile about the Ush Pass. There is room for a brigade, or even a division, to encamp in some open ground at Sraghar, about a mile beyond Shudand, and smaller bodies could easily encamp in several places en route.

A series of small hamlets rather than villages are passed in the Rod gorge, all within a mile or so of each other, as far as the ninth mile; they belong to all kinds of sections of the Kakars, but near Kudin up the River Sabonai about 3 miles, is Saghin, a Sayad village.

Four streams, the Rivers Waria, Sabonai, Wargai, and Shudand, run into the River Ro'd on the right bank, but none on the left. After the ninth mile, at Shudand, there are no signs of cultivation, or even of human habitation.

The country at first is as before described—lofty hills on either side of the gorge of the River Rod. The main differences noticeable being the large number of willows and fruit-trees about the villages and along the river-banks. Cultivation in terraces is considerable—wheat, millet, Indian corn (maize), barley (and ? oats also) and lucerne, being raised. The practice of reclaiming land by groins run in to the river-bed before described is to be observed also here. Sheep and goats also abound. The houses or huts become rougher as the gorge is ascended, degenerating into mere grass and wood huts, the sides of which are sometimes scooped out of the hill-side. The inhabitants are Kakars of all sections, but Panizais predominate. As the greater heights are reached, the hills become wooded, and, after Shudand is passed, the country becomes an uninhabited mountain tract, producing only timber. Besides the usual over growths, plum (ber) trees, junipers, and conifers (probably cedars and cypresses) are to be seen along the hill-sides, and a bush like a rose. A broom-like plant also grows here which the natives use as medicine, smoking it like tobacco.

A grand view of the snowy range of Mt. Mazhwo is obtained to the s. from many points, and on the whole the country is pleasanter to look upon than is usual in Afghanistan, despite its wildness. The climate at this time of year (spring) is charming.

The hills appear to be composed, as usual, of sandstones and clays of various colours, slate and shale.

Ispira Ragha, 7,800 ft., is merely the name of a plateau in the wild hilly country to the N. of Mt. Mazhwo. There is room for a brigade to encamp with comfort. No supplies can be procured, and there is no habitation within miles of the place. Water is obtained near by from the River Loghan. There is a fine view.

16 March. Regiment marched to Oboshki (Obushtkai). General forward march line from Ispira Ragha to Khwra two miles past Oboshki (Obushtkai) is bearing 86°.

For 4 miles the road ascends, till it roaches the watershed at Chirimomon. At that spot one man attempted to bar the road, he was captured.

About 3 or 4 miles on a party of 40 or 50 armed men were seen on the Hills to our right, and they fired a shot. Part of the Regiment was thrown into skirmishing order and arrangements for the attack made, but the Kakar gave in.

The road runs back for a mile along the old track, after which it runs straight on due E. through the narrow mountain valley of the River Topobargh for half a mile till the Topobargh Pass is reached. The kotal is barely perceptible, and the ascent is very slight. After this the road runs along the valley, or rather upland plateau, drained by the River Momand at the foot of Mt. Spinskhar. The ascent is gradual as far as the Nangaluna Pass (8,500 ft.), which is four miles out. After passing this, the road gradually descends in an E. direction down the river known successively as the Nangaluna, Obushtkai, and Khwara. Like the ascent, the descent is gradual and easy. The road is throughout easy, good, and well marked. It is somewhat hilly and rocky about the passes and river-heads, but would nowhere give difficulty.

The country passed through is at first hilly and fairly open, and in general appearance like that described about Ispira Ragha. After the Topobargh Pass there is a wide hilly plateau for a couple of miles, and just about the Nangaluna Pass the country is broken and hilly, and somewhat rocky. After this second pass there is a wide plateau, with curious low flat-topped hills running across it N. and S. This plateau is bounded by the Spinskhar, Surlo, and Khargai ranges to the S., and by the Nangaluna Hills and the hill lands of Ghobargai to the N., beyond which lies the Zhob Valley in the distance. To the E. is the remarkable table-like hill Mt. Syajgai, and the Chimjan Ghar Hills.

The river-beds are broad and stony as usual, but have a slight gradient. They are usually dry, and, though the springs are not far apart, water is rather scarce. There are no signs of habitation till the eighth mile is reached, where there is a graveyard at Nasrat, near which, in the hills, but not visible, is a village called Radingzai (Dumar, Kakar). At ten miles is the village of Obushtkai (Dumar) on the road-side—a wretched little hamlet. Soon after this, signs of wheat-cultivation by means of kuls and kareze's are apparent, and in the hills are the villages of Gurmai and Kurbi (Zakhpel, Kakar). There is a path, said to be bad, leading from Gurmai, past Mt. Surghwand, as far as the Mehtarzai country about Mt. Kand. The inhabitants are all Kakars, and have a wild, squalid appearance. After the eighth mile trees begin to disappear, and the country to bear that treeless appearance so noticeable in Afghanistan. The overgrowths are as usual. The composition of the hills is, as usual, of clays and sandstones of sorts, but gneiss and schist are also found in places. About Khwara there are a good many fossils. There is a fine view of the snowy ranges of Mazhwo, Spinskhar, Surlo, and Khargai to the S., and to the N., of Nanaluna and the broken country of Ghobargai. Mt. Syajgai is very peculiar and would be a landmark from any point. The country is pleasant to look at, and the climate now (spring) charming. Mts. Sukghwand, Cheshan, Chimjan Ghar, and Matkhilar are also visible, besides those mentioned already.

Khwara, 7,900 ft., no village—a convenient spacious encamping-ground on the banks of the River Khwara. No supplies, but water is sufficient.


17 March. Regiment marched to Chingan, 8¼ miles. General forward march line to Chingan (Chimjan) bearing 89°.

The road follows the line of the variously named river mentioned in the last stage, and now called the Chimjan. It runs along its bed, now broad, or along the valley on its banks. Where it follows the bed it is stony, but easy and level, the descent being almost imperceptible, and in the valley it is sometimes a little hilly. It is good and easy throughout. There is water in places in the river-bed, but it is nowhere troublesome. The country presents the same treeless, water-scoured, stony appearance frequently noticed before. The overgrowths are the same as usual—camelthorn and southernwood, and fruit-trees about the village. Cultivation is carried on in patches by the river-banks. At this time of year (spring) there is green wheat to be seen about; barley and Indian corn are also raised. The country is thinly populated by Zakhpel Kakars and some Dumar Kakars, and only one village was passed en route, Salazh (Zaghpel). The huts are better, being the same as those in the lower Rod Valley about Isaf Kach. Cattle, sheep, and goats are to be seen feeding in places, and as observed in the Rod Valley, there are signs of embanking the river to keep it within its bed.

The valley becomes wider and more open as the river flows downward, and there is a fine view down towards Smalan, e.s.e. The most remarkable feature being the isolated Mt. Syajgai above mentioned, which stands out in the middle of the valley.

Chimjan, 7,400ft., is a Zakhpel (Kakar) village of some size at the foot of the Chimjan Ghar Hills. Supplies are fair, but limited as to choice—bhoosa, firewood, grass, lucerne, sheep, and goats, but hardly anything else. A road leads N. from this, via the Zaghulun Pass, to the Zhob Valley, and another N.E., along the valley to Dargai and Chinali. The camping-ground is along the river opposite (S.) the village. It is spacious, but very stony.

19 March. Regiment marched to Chinalle, 13 miles.



20 March. Regiment marched to Kutchunlll, 9 ¼ miles. Heard rumours of an intended attack at night. Pickets all doubled, night passed quietly.

At Baianai the 1st Column and the 3rd Column left the road to proceed S.S.E. toward the Pai and Tal Vallays.

The march from Chinalle to Baianai followed a general forward bearing of 120°.

The road leads close under Mt. Syajgai, running along the bed of the river so variously named, but now called permanently the River Kach, past some low hills, called the Zhar Hills, at the foot of Mt. Syajgai. It is here good, direct and easy, but a little rough and stony in the river. After passing Mt. Syajgai 7 miles out, it runs in a S.E. direction (115°) straight across the Shor Valley towards the Zharuband Peak, which is reached at the 13th mile. The River Kach is crossed at the 10th mile, here a broad torrent-bed a quarter of a mile across, but giving no trouble. The road so far is fairly level and easy throughout, though stony. There are a few easy nullah-beds about Mt. Syajgai and the hills to be crossed. After reaching and passing the Zharuband Peak the road runs across a small valley called the Mzarai, in a more southern direction (135°), to some springs called the Mzarai Springs. It is here stony and hilly, and crosses frequent nullahs and streams, several, especially the River Ghwazh, have bad banks, and would, when flooded, be formidable obstacles. After the Mzarai Springs are passed

the road leads over a small and easy ko'tal through the Ghultoi Hills, across a hilly valley, and then over another similar kotal through the Mzarai Hills into the Baianai Valley, which it follows in an E. direction for a couple of miles, and then, by a sharp turn S. through the Baianai Hills, to the village of Baianai. After passing the Mzarai Springs the road is bad, stony, hilly and rugged, passing numberless nullah-beds. It is, in fact, a fair-weather road, and it is doubtful whether it would be practicable in bad weather. This latter part of the country is called, as a whole, the Baia'nai Pass.


The country passed is singularly barren of human life, and has a deserted appearance, there being no signs of cultivation anywhere en route. Water also is scarce, being obtainable only at the Plan, Mzarai, and Uchshan Springs, but there are no villages by them. The Shor Valley is a wide and somewhat flat valley, about 10 miles wide, but quite bare, except of tufts of grass and camelthorn, and very stony. To the N.E. runs the Sungalun Valley, somewhat similar to it. In this there are two villages, Dargai and China'li (both Zakhpel Kakar), about which there is some cultivation. Kach, an Amakzai (Kakar) village, lies among some hills to the e. The country in the Mzarai Valley is very similar, but there is more grass there. The Mzarai, Ghulto, and Baianai Hills are of whitish limestone and the country through the Baianai Pass is wild and rugged and much cut into by nullahs, the beds of which are full of limestone chips from the hills. There is a good deal of grass in the Bainai Valley, also barberries, olives, camelthorn, and a few trees also about the slopes of the hills in the Shor Valley. There is swampy and green land about the Mzarai Springs. The glaciis observed before is to be remarked in the Shor Valley. The peculiar feature of the country is the number of well-worn tracks and pathways met with. These are very numerous, and run in all

directions, as will be seen by the maps; they give the country an appearance of having an amount of traffic over it not warranted by its sparse population. A good many are said to lead to places where wood is got in the hills. The parallel run of the hills noticed to the N. is also to be observed to the S. of the Shor Valley. There are fine views of the many hills surrounding the valleys from all points.

Baianai, 6,500 feet, is a small Dumar (Kakar) mud fort and village, in a narrow secluded valley running W. to E. into the Borai Valley, over which there is a fine view towards the Sherkai Peak and the Kohar Hills. Supplies are next to none, but water is plentiful and good. The camping-ground is spacious but stony, and its natural drainage is good. The position is somewhat dangerous for troops in an enemy's country.

21 March. Regiment marched to Singour (Sinxawai), 18 miles.

Major Higginson with the Kandahar Column, and was present in the Affair at Baghao (Baghawa)(mentioned in Major Keen's Reportl)



After marching 7 or 8 miles, came to the Wandil (Wangai) Pass, and a lot of armed men showed on the heights to the left, but disappeared on two shots from the guns being fired at them. The Head of the Column went on quietly, with all precautions taken, though the pass. It halted for two hours, just before debouching from the pass. When the baggage appeared to be well up, it proceeded to Singour (Singaweh (Sinxawai)). On the arrival of the rear guard, commanded by Captain Campbell, he reported he had been attacked on entering the Pass by two to three hundred men. One man of the regiment, Sepoy Syed Akhmed, was killed. The enemy were driven off with loss and the baggage escorted safely into camp. Two companies of the Regiment, C and D. formed part of the rear guard, Captain Campbell, showed very great judgement and coolness in the affair and he spoke most highly of the behaviour of Jemadar Mir Butt and the men. For his report, see below:

Camp Singaweh,
The 22nd March 1879.

Sir,

In compliance with your request, I have the honor to forward a report in writing, of an attack by two hundred (200) of the enemy, on the Rear Guard²⁸ under my Command while defiling through the Undah Pass yesterday afternoon, the 21st Instant.

I was yesterday detailed to accompany the rear column under Major Higginson, 1st Punjab Infantry.

At 11-30 A.M., and when about 8 miles from the last encampment I was ordered to proceed to a Cavalry Picquet, stationed under the hills on the left of the road, and to enquire why they were placed there. On my arrival, I found some of the enemy had taken up a position in front of the picquet. I reported the same to Major Higginson, who sent me a Havilda's party of the 1st Punjab Infantry. I then advanced to the foot of the hill to reconnoitre, when about two hundred men, showed themselves, all armed with matchlocks and swords. I then retired and reported the above to Major Higginson who strengthened me by 2 Companies 1st Punjab Infantry and gave me orders, "to watch the enemy, until the arrival of the Rear Guard, and then to retire covering the rear of the Baggage, hut on no account to open fire unless I was first fired at."

I accordingly took up a position (Marked A in Sketch²⁹) just out of matchlock-range of the Hills, and sent forward an Afridi Havildar to parley with the enemy, who was met half way between the two forces by a Malik and a long conversation ensued. I explained to them our friendly intentions, and so far succeeded, that our retirement upwards of a hundred came down to the plains and dispersed towards their homes. The rear guard arrived at 1-15 P.M. I retired between the hills and the rear of the Baggage, with one company in skirmishing order, the other in support I was followed up by about thirty (30), of the enemy who kept the tops of the hills. At the entrance of the Unda Pass at 2 P.M. we halted, as several camels had thrown their loads. I then noticed some men descending the hill, and five of them took up a position, within a hundred yards of the 2nd Sind Horse and myself (Marked B in Sketch). I sent a Non-commissioned officer and two men 1st Punjab Infantry, who spoke Pushtoo, to order them to retire, which they did, but no sooner did I give the order for our party to retire, than a shot was fired at me followed by four more into the Cavalry, one horse being wounded. I then returned the fire by which two of the enemy were killed. Hearing firing in my rear, that is towards the Baggage, I galloped back, and found both heights of the Pass were strongly occupied by the enemy, who kept up a well sustained fire and shewed signs of advancing on the Baggage. I immediately crowned the heights (Marked C & D in Sketch) and drove the enemy back, at the same time I ordered a Native Officer and 27 Rifles 1st Punjab Infantry to halt on the Kotul, (Marked C & D in Sketch) until all the Baggage was clear, and to cover the heights to the right. When I saw the pass was clear of Baggage, I ordered the retirement, and was at once followed up by about two hundred (200) of the enemy, who opened fire from all sides. I consider the small loss we sustained was due to the cool and excellent manner, in which Jemadar Mir Butt with his company of Afridis, covered the retirement. The last shot fired by the enemy was at 3-45. P.M. Our loss was one (1) Sepoy, 1st Punjab Infantry—killed, and one (1) horse 2nd Sind Horse—wounded. On account of the roughness of the ground, the loss of the enemy is uncertain, but one body, supposed to be that of a Chief Malik, was found, and four (4) others were distinctly seen to fall.

I have the honor to be Sir,

The Officer Commanding
First Column,
Thull Chotali Field Force.

Your most obedient Servant,
LORNE CAMPBELL, CaptaiN.
1st Punjab Infantry

24th March. Regiment marched to Baggas, 11 ½ miles.

About two hours after reaching camp, the vedettes brought in information of the approach of a large force of the enemy. The men fell in, in wonderfully quick time. A. B. C. and F. Companies were left to protect the Camp, the remainder of the Regiment under Major Higginson, was taken out to meet the enemy. A party of the Regiment under Major Vallings, was thrown into skirmishing order, in front of the guns. Large masses of the enemy were seen advancing in line on to the Camp, about 1,200 yards off, and the hills to our right wore crowded with the enemy. After the guns had fired a few rounds, the

²⁸ 1st Punjab Infantry: 1 British Officer, 2 Native Officer, 83 Rifles. 2nd Sind Horse: 1 Daffadar, 28 Sabres

²⁹ Sketch is not available.

enemy were seen to halt and move off to the right and left. Major Vallings with his party, moved to the left. Major Higginson and Captain Campbell, with the Companies of the Regiment were sent to endeavour to scale the heights on the right, and to, the enemy of it. The enemy here were in great force and the hills extremely difficult and precipitous, but these two officers, took their men up in the most gallant manner; at times the men had to get on one another's shoulders to scale the rocks. The heights were scaled in the face of heavy fire and rocks hurled at them, and the enemy were turned off them with a very heavy loss, Both these officers had personal encounters with the enemy, and they speak in the highest praise of the behaviour of the men. In the meantime, Major Vallings, having stopped a rush of some of the enemy, the men on the left, followed the retreating enemy into the gorge, from from which they had advanced to attack us, where he was practically joined by Major Higginson on the heights, and the enemy being completely defeated, the troops returned to, Camp. On this occasion the Regiment showed its old spirit and Major Higginson's and Vallings' and Captain Campbell's and Lieutenant Pear's gallant conduct was brought very favorably to the notice of Major General Biddulph.

The following rewards of the Indian Order of Merit were given in the Native ranks on this occasion³⁰:



Subadar Major Pyabb and Sidar Bhadur advanced from 2nd Class to 1st Class of the Order of Merit.

Jemadar Mir Butt, Naick Peer Mahamed, Sepoy Gul Mahamed (wounded), and Sepoy Meera Singh were admitted to the 3rd Class of the Order.

← Indian Order of Merit, 1st Class (gold) award and 3rd Class (silver) award.

The Regiment had two men killed and five men wounded.

Baghao 24th March 1879
No.1819 A, dated Simla 26th April 1879

From: Colonel C. C. Johnston C.B. Officiating Quarter Master General in India.

To: Colonel H. R. Burne C.B. Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

The Commander-in-Chief in India desires me to forward, for the information of the Government of India the accompanying reports (No. 249 K. of 15th April 1879, with enclosures) received from

Lieutenant General D. M. Stewart, C.B., commanding the forces in Southern Afghanistan, of a praiseworthy affair, which took place on the 24th March, in which troops forming, the 1st Column of the Thull-Chotiali Field Force, under Major F. J. Keen, were attacked at Baghao by tribes from Zhob and Bori Valleys numbering about 3,000 under Malik Shah Jehan.

2. Major Keen and the officers and men under his command appear to have done good service, and to have thoroughly defeated the enemy, their loss being 150 killed, while that of the troops under Major Keen was 2 killed and 5 wounded.

No. 249-K, dated Kandahar 13th April 1879

From: Lieutenant General D. M. Stewart, C.B., Commanding Field Forces, Southern Afghanistan.

To: Quarter Master General in India.

Thull-Chotiali Field Force
Major F. J. Keen, 1st Punjab Infantry, Commanding.

³⁰ G.G.O. No. 583 dated 26th June 1879.

	British	Gunners
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Rank & File</i>
2 Guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery...	1	45
2 Guns No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery...	2	79
8th Bengal Cavalry.....	2	158
2nd Sind Horse.....	1	98
1st Punjab Infantry.....	7	499
Total Column Strength.....	13	879

I have the honor to report for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that at Baghao on the 24th March, the leading Column in the movement by the Thull-Chotiali route towards Dera Khan engaged an enemy from the Zhob and Bori Valleys numbering some 3,000 men.

2. The tribal levies, led by Maliks Shah Jehan, of Zhob, and Gawanat of Bori, moved in regular order to the attack of the Camp, at about 3 p.m. Major Keen had meanwhile received notice of their approach, through his videttes, and had completed his disposition for a counter attack, which was successfully carried out, the enemy being repulsed, with a loss of 150 killed, while of the troops engaged 2 were killed and 5 wounded.

3. Major Keen, Commanding appears to have shewn judgement in the arrangements made on the occasion, and behaviour of the troops was excellent.

4. I have the honor to enclose report in original, furnishing details.

No. 152, dated Camp Oorizai, Bori Valley, 31st March 1879.

From: Major General M. A. S. Biddulph, C.B., Commanding the Thull-Chotiali Field Force.
To: The Assistant Quarter Master-General, Field Forces Southern Afghanistan.

I have the honor to forward herewith for the information of the Lieutenant General, Commanding the Field Forces in Southern Afghanistan, the letter marginally noted, with annexed reports, describing an affair, which took place on the afternoon of the 24th March, when Major Keen's (the 1st) column of the troops under my command, was attacked by a tribal enemy, of about 3,000 strong, which he repulsed with a loss of 150 killed on the part of the enemy, and of two (2) killed and 5 wounded on our side.

<p>No. 3, Dated Camp Baghao, 25th March 1879 ; From: Major Keen Commanding 1st Column Thull-Chotiali, a Field Force ; To: Assistant Adjutant General. Return of Casualties.</p>
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The report made by Major Keen, shows that the encampment of the troops at Baghao was properly formed and that the usual outposts were placed, and that due notice of the coming attack, was given by the videttes. Major Keen reports and Major Sandeman states in his report, that the Maliks of Baghao, gave simultaneous notice of the intended onset of the tribal enemy.

I gather from the reports forwarded, and from Native testimony, that the enemy was composed of Zholis and Boris, consisting of Sanzars, Umankheyls, Arab Kheyls, and others; and that the force was led by Maliks Shah Jehan, and Gawanat of Bori.

The Zhob country lies to the North of Bori, distance some 50 miles from Baghao, and the portion of the force that came from Zhob, had to cross the Bori country, at the upper end of the valley, and the combined enemy, following up the 1st column entered the Samalan Valley, by the defile in the neighbourhood of Biani. I calculate that many of the troops of the hostile force, from distant villages, in the Zhob valley, must have traversed a distance of 60 or 70 miles, and that the collection of such a body of men shows that the attack was premeditated, and that a considerable time was occupied in collecting the men, and in making the march to Baghao.

The Bori Valley lies to the north of and next to the Samalan and Baghao Valleys; and there are many passes through the intervening ridge through which roads communicate between the two valleys.

The 1st column, when at Chingan, Dargai and Shinti was in the more immediate neighbourhood of the Zhob Valley : but no news of the gathering of the men appeared to have reached it. At the same time the column was disturbed on its march, by the attacks of small bodies for some days previous to the main attack.

The attack was made in a curved line, with the flanks thrown forwards and in numbers sufficient to make such an onset, exceedingly dangerous, badly armed though the enemy were, if it had been allowed to come home and envelope the camp.

Major Keen had time however to fall in his troops in due order, and his dispositions were made with judgment. The counter-attack of the troops under the command of Major Keen, shows a spirited action on his part. The officers in the subordinate commands supported him in a capable manner, and the troops of all arms behaved with a courage and devotion worthy of all praise.

The conduct of the 1st Punjab Infantry in scaling the heights and entering into a hand-to-hand contest with the enemy, I desire to bring to particular notice.

I arrived at Biani on the 29th and there heard from the headman of that place of the action that had taken place. In consequence of this information, and considering the part taken by the Utman Kheyls of the Bori Valley, I am making the march of the 2nd column through the Bori country and the 3rd column under Brigadier General Nuthall, is proceeding parallel to me by the Samalan Valley, in communication with me daily.

I have not met with any disturbance or seen any hostile bodies : and I am informed that the enemy's force is disbanded, and that the chiefs and people are quite satisfied of their inability to oppose our troops in their passage through this country.

Malik Gawanat, Chief of the Uman Kheyls is with me here, rendering good service in procuring supplies, and I have so far found sufficient for the support of the column. I am given to understand that the richer portion of the Valley, lies directly in our track to the eastward.

No. 3, Dated Camp Baghao, 25th March 1879.

From: Major F. J. Keen, Commanding 1st Column Thull-Chotiali Field Force.

To: The Assistant Adjutant-General. Thull-Chotiali, Field Force

I have the honor to report that the column under my command marched from Camp Singaway on the 24th Instant, and arrived at Baghao at about 1 P. M. The usual picquets both Cavalry and Infantry were posted, and at about 5 P.M., two Cavalry videttes galloped into Camp, and reported the advance of a large force. This news was given at the same time by the maliks of the village. I immediately gave orders to fall in, and made dispositions for the safe protection of the camp, leaving Major G. U. Prior, 100th Regiment, Assistant Quarter Master General in Command, with two guns of the Peshawar Mountain Battery, under Lieutenant R. A. C. King, one Squadron of the 2nd Sind Horse, under Captain C. H. de N. Lucas, and 4 Companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry with orders to make such dispositions as he thought fit to meet any attack from the East. I myself proceeded with the guns of the Jacobabad Mountain Battery, under Captain R. Wace, one Squadron of the 8th Bengal Cavalry, under Major N. Chapman, and four Companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major T. Higginson in the direction of the attack.

When the enemy first appeared in sight, they were drawn up in a long line, extending for about 700 yards, and I should say that those who were on the lower slope of the hill, alone numbered over 1,000, while the number of those on the Hill itself, could not be ascertained.

The enemy advanced steadily in this formation firing. I instructed Major Chapman, 8th Bengal Cavalry, to advance with his Squadron, so as to protect ray left flank, which he did most effectually, and relieved me of all anxiety in that direction.

A party of the 1st Punjab Infantry under Major A. Vallings, then moved forward in skirmishing order on the ridges, and the two guns of the Jacobabad Battery were brought into action.

After two or three rounds the enemy were seen to halt, and some of them made their way up the hills on my right. I therefore sent Major Higginson and Captain R. L. H. D. Campbell, with about 2 Companies of the 1st Punjab

Infantry, to endeavour to clear the heights. The heights were extremely difficult, but they took their men up in the most gallant manner, and in the face of a determined resistance, gained the summit and drove the enemy before them, inflicting very heavy loss.

The descent was so precipitous on the further side of the hilly that a great number of the enemy were unable to get away, and were shot or captured in the attempt.

Meanwhile Major Vallings had advanced along our left, driving the enemy before him, and Toimding the west end of the hill, took up a position on the farther side, facing the hill over which the enemy were attempting to escape.

The gun of the Jacobabad Mountain Battery (No. 2 Bombay Mountain Battery), was detached to accompany Major Chapman, 8th Bengal Cavalry, and the firing of the gun was seen to do great execution.

The other gun, under Captain Wace, moved along the ridges, coming into action whenever opportunity offered, and making very good firing.

After a little while Major Vallings advanced up the gorge, where a number of men were concealed in caves and behind rocks, and drove them from their position.

The two forces under Major Higginson and Major Vallings, having thus practically touched although divided by a precipice, and the enemy being utterly routed, further pursuit was stopped, and the force was ordered to return to Camp, which was reached at 6 P.M.

The majority of the enemy were men from Zhob and Bori under Malik Shah Jehan.

Owing to the smallness of our numbers, I felt it to be absolutely necessary to take the initiative, before the plans of the enemy were more fully developed, and the very spirited manner in which the troops advanced to the attack and so signally defeated the enemy is worthy of all praise.

Owing to the small body of British officers with the column, it follows that all were prominently engaged, and I am deeply in-debted to them all.

To Captain R. Wace and Lieutenant R N. R Robertson for the admirable manner in which their guns were worked; to Major H. Chapman, 8th Bengal Cavalry, for the very excellent way he handled his Cavalry, and protected our left flank : to Majors T. Higginson and A. Vallings, 1st Punjab Infantry, who led the men under their command over most difficult ground : and to Captain L. E. H. D. Campbell, 1st Punjab Infantry, for the ready assistance he rendered to Major Higginson, in crowning the heights, my best thanks are due.

To Major G. U. Prior, 100th Regiment, who was left in command of the troops in Camp and whose disposition of them, relieved me of the anxiety, which I felt for its safety on account of a reported enemy, from the Eastern end of the Valley, my thanks are due : also to Captain C. A. de N. Lucas, 2nd Sind Horse, and Lieutenant R. A. G. King, Peshawur Mountain Battery, who acted with him. To Captain H. F. Showers, 1st Punjab Infantry, Transport officer, and Lieutenant H. L. Wells R. E., I am much indebted for the willing manner in which they placed their services at my disposal, and the assistance they rendered.

To Lieutenant T. C. Pears, 1st Punjab Infantry, who has been doing the duties of Staff Officer to the Column, I offer my cordial thanks, for his very willing assistance on this occasion. He is an officer ever ready for work. I regret to say that our loss in this engagement was two sepoy of the 1st Punjab Infantry killed; one Havildar and four sepoy of 1st Punjab Infantry wounded : and one horse (Major Chapman's, 8th Bengal Cavalry) wounded by a sword cut. The loss of the enemy is estimated at 150 killed ; number of wounded unknown. Seventy-two prisoners have been taken, five of whom are wounded. A number of arms consisting of matchlocks and tulwars, are in our possession.

Major Sandeman, C.S.I. Governor Generals Agent for Biluchistan accompanied me during the time the engagement lasted, and I am much indebted to him for his valuable counsel.

A nominal roll of the killed and wounded, and also a sketch of the ground³¹, is attached, and reports by Major Prior, Assistant-Quarter-Master-General and Captain Wace, Royal Artillery.

Yesterday morning (26th March) I sent out a reconnoitring party under the Command of Major Higginson, 1st Punjab Infantry, over the scene of the engagement, to see if any armed parties were in the neighbourhood. No parties of the enemy were seen ; 103 dead bodies were found on the ground ; and information was given by wounded men, that during the whole night the dead and wounded were being carried off.

Since the above report was written, positive information has been received as to the number of the enemy. Several of the Maliks who were engaged in the attack have since tendered their submission to the Governor-General's Agent. These men state that their force numbered 3,000 men.

Return of Casualties


Return of killed, wounded and missing in action of Baghao on the 24th March 1879:

Corps.	Killed	Wounded		H o r s e s	T o t a l M e n	R e m a r k s
	Rank and File	Sgts & Hav	Rank and File			
No. 3 Mountain Battery P. F. F. (2 Guns)....	*Major Chapman's
Jacobabad Mountain (2 guns).....	
8th Bengal Cavalry (1 Squadron).....	1*	
2nd Sind Horse (1 Squadron).....	
1st Punjab Infantry.....	2	1	4	7	
Total.....	2	1	4	7	
Grand Total.....	2	1	4	7	

26 March. The Regiment marched to Rahi, 11 ½ miles.

28 March. The Regiment marched to Thull, 15 miles.

2 April 1879. The Regiment marched to Sher Khan-ka-Kila, 10 miles.



3 April. The Regiment marched to Chotiali, 5 miles.

³¹ The Sketch is not included.

Here Colonel Prendergast's Column from Dera Ghazi Khan joined us.

5 April. The Regiment marched to Barumzaie (Brahmazai Khelat), 21 miles.

6 April. The Regiment marched to Paind Kutch, 9 miles.

7 April. The Regiment marched to Bala Daka (Bala Dhara), 5 miles.

8 April. The Regiment marched to Hun Pass (Han Pass), 17 miles.



9 April. The Regiment marched to Nahr Kot, 12 miles. Joined Major General Biddulph's Column, and No. 1 Column was broken up.

The Regiment halted at Nahr Kot from 9 April to 7 May, owing to complications with a section of the Muree Tribe, they having murdered some Camp followers of the officers in the Political Department.

On 7 May the Regiment began the final stages of the march back to India.

7 May 1879. The Regiment marched to Haji-ka-Kote, 11 miles.

8 May. The Regiment marched to Dakan-ka-Kote, 11 miles.

9 May. The Regiment marched to Rukni, 21 miles.

10 May. The Regiment marched to Bush Kushi, 12 miles. The first part of this march is all up hill, as far as Fort Munroe-Sanitarium (6,000 feet).

11 May. The Regiment marched to Ziriadan, 6 miles, all downhill and very steep.

12 May. The Regiment marched to Choti Bala, 12 miles.

14 May. The Regiment marched to Choti, 18 miles.

15 May. The Regiment marched to Kot Chota, 12 miles.



16 May. The Regiment marched to Dera Ghazi Khan, 14 miles.

21 May. The Regiment marched towards Dera Ismal Khan, and arrived there on 29 May, and the Regiment was distributed over the three lines there. The Regiment had been absent from India since March 1877: all furlough, short leave, and discharges had been stopped over this time.



The Regiments main duty station would be Quetta for the remainder of 1879.

15 June 1879. Furlough opened to the Regiment.

1880. The 1880 Harts Army List shows the Regiments main duty station was Edwardesabad.

The British Position on the Frontier at the Close of the 2nd Afghan War

The position of frontier political affairs when Abdur Rahman Khan³² ascended the throne of Kabul was as follows. Just prior to the 2nd Afghan War the Russians saw the opportunity to expand into Central Asia to this end they engaged in the Russo-Turkish War between April 1877 and March 1878. The Russian-led coalition won the war, pushing the Ottomans back all the way to the gates of Constantinople, leading to the intervention of the western European great powers.

← *Abdur Rahman Khan GCSI (Pashto/Dari: عبدالرحمن خان) (between 1840 and 1844–1 October 1901) was Amir of Afghanistan from 1880 to his death in 1901*

As a result, Russia succeeded in claiming provinces in the Caucasus, namely Kars and Batumi, and also annexed the Budjak region. The principalities of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, each of which had had *de facto* sovereignty for some years, formally proclaimed independence from the Ottoman Empire. After almost five centuries of Ottoman

³² Abdur Rahman Khan GCSI (Pashto/Dari: عبدالرحمن خان) (between 1840 and 1844 – 1 October 1901) was Amir of Afghanistan from 1880 to his death in 1901. He is known for uniting the country after years of internal fighting and negotiation of the Durand Line Agreement with British India.

domination (1396–1878), the Principality of Bulgaria emerged as an autonomous Bulgarian state with support and military intervention from Russia.

The Russians were then north of the Kopet Dagh (the line of mountains which now defines Persia's northern frontier), exceedingly busy in reducing the Tekke Turkomans, a campaign which was finally accomplished in December 1880 to January 1881 by the brutal Russian victory of General Mikhail Dmitriyevich Skobelev (Scobeloff) at the Siege of Geok Tepe (Denghi Tepe). Around 8,000 Turkmen soldiers and civilians, including women and children were slaughtered in a bloodbath in their flight, along with an additional 6,500 who died inside the fortress. The Russians massacre included all Turkmen males in the fortress who had not escaped, but they spared some 5,000 women and children and freed 600 Persian slaves. The defeat at Geok Tepe and the following slaughter broke the Turkmen resistance and decided the fate of Transcaspia, which was annexed to the Russian Empire. The great slaughter proved too much to stomach reducing the Akhal-Tekke country to complete submission. Skobelev was removed from his command because of the massacre. He was advancing on Ashkhabad and Kalat-i-Nadiri when he was disavowed and recalled to Moscow. He was given the command at Minsk. The official reason for his transfer to Europe was to appease European public opinion over the slaughter at Geok Tepe. Some have suggested that he was suffering from delusions of grandeur and showing signs of political ambition.

Although Merve was distinctly threatened, they were still at a considerable distance from that place, separated there from by a wide space of desert country. But by September 1881 the Trans-Caspian Railway had reached Askabad, and then commenced a series of remarkable journeys of exploration by a young Russian engineer Mr. M. Lessar towards Herat, which, with the Russians, seems to be the usual precursor of territorial expansion. The successful issue of the Afghan campaign, undertaken because a Russian mission had been received at Kabul whilst our own mission had been denied entrance, had settled the question of Russian predominance in the Court of Kabul, and the result was immediate Russian activity on the Herat border. Ultimately the issue of the Russo-Afghan Border would be decided by the Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission likely avoiding possible war with Russia and Britain.

On 22 July 1880 the British government recognized Abdur Rahman Khan as Emir, or ruler, of Afghanistan. This marked the formal end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. But it made no real impact on a different kind of military conflict, one that overlapped with issues of state between Afghanistan and British India. This was a chronic, low intensity military confrontation in the borderlands that straddled the boundary between the two states. For the British, the problem was that these two conflicts seemed to weave into one. Lepel Griffin, British negotiator in Kabul, presented the Emir with a memorandum that expressed this British point of view, and their principal objective:

... since the British Government admits no right of interference by Foreign Powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that Your Highness can have no political relations with any foreign Power except with the British Government³³.

The poorly defined line of sovereign demarcation between Afghanistan and British India was more than 1,250 miles (2010 km) long. If the state of Afghanistan remained independent but weak, that could provide physical security against invasion to British India. The British generally agreed this made Afghanistan a strategic buffer zone for their own imperial defence. But there were two fundamental problems. If a weak Afghanistan fell under the control of a strong hostile Power, that Power might use it as a springboard from which to invade India. The British saw Russia as such a Power; alarm over apparent Russian intrigue provoked two British invasions of Afghanistan, in 1839 and 1878. But while a British presence in Afghanistan might keep invasion at bay, it gave no such protection against borderland incursion. Not until the Durand Line (Pashto: د ډيورنډ کرښه; Urdu: ڈیورنڈ لائن), formed the Afghanistan–Northwest Frontier border, a 1,660 mile (2,670-km) international land border between Afghanistan and what would become Pakistan in South Asia was there an established borderland boundary. The western end runs to the border with Iran and the eastern end to the border with China.

In the early days of his sovereignty, Abdur Rahman was occupied in strengthening his own position, that process did not involve any interference with the Pathan tribes who occupied his frontier along the border with India. That long strip of rugged mountain country which runs practically the whole length of Eastern Afghanistan, and which extends northwards through the Kuram and the Khyber, up the borders of the Swat River until it merges in the general Hindu Kush system, was no integral part of his sovereignty. Through this band of unutterably rugged and unattractive hills all the passes of the

³³ British Library (BL), India Office Records (IOR), L/PS/20 Memo 12, Note on some points connected with the North-western Frontier of Afghanistan, with special reference to Badgheis and Panjdeh, 13 March 1885.

frontier run. It forms no great water-divide, for all the big rivers which pass through its limestone gates, cutting across the main strike of the hills, come from the high lands of Afghanistan. It is a wide strip of mountain wilderness (which used to be considered inaccessible, but which has not altogether proved so), called by the ancients Roh, and from time immemorial this has been the home of the original Pathan, the speaker of the Pushtu tongue.

With these people no Amir of Afghanistan has ever greatly interfered. There was no object in interfering so long as they refrained from interference themselves. Their country is, as a rule, so wild and so difficult that, if occupied by any people who could fight with modern weapons, they would be practically unassailable. The collection of revenue would be a work of difficulty and patience, and the process of enforcing sub mission would cost a good deal more than the value of the revenue.

Dost Mahomed wisely left these troublesome folk alone, and Abdur Rahman at first followed his example. It was the proud boast of these mountaineers that they were independent and unconquered, a boast that is fairly justified by history. Yet these tribes of the frontier have always owned affinity with the Afghan peoples in community of language and religion. If the king of Afghanistan has not been their king, he has been their religious chief, their prophet, and their political referee. With few exceptions (such as the Turis of Kuram and another clan on the Kohat borders) they are all Sunnis by faith, and we must not regard too lightly the bonds of religious conviction. Moreover, temptation with these border people lies all on the side of India. Their own lands are barren and rough, and cultivation is confined to the narrowest strips of alluvial soil which may be found alongside their mountain streams. Yet they have good store of cattle and sheep and goats, and some of the in breed an admirable race of donkeys and horses. Their houses are substantially built, and they live in fair comfort, paying no taxes. But they are born with the instincts of the old Scottish border robber in them, and the fat plains of the Punjab are their traditional hunting-grounds. And so, things will remain until a new generation arises that sees more clearly the financial advantages of law and order.

Of all these mountain people none have given more trouble than the Wazirs or Waziris. They are divided into two great clans, the Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khel, and they occupy a little Switzerland of their own, dove tailed in between the Gomul and Tochi rivers. It is sufficiently far north to partake rather of the characteristics of the mountains of the Kuram and Safed Koh than of the Sulimani hills to the south. Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich describes the country in 1881:

“There are pine trees and grand deodars on the far slopes of Waziristan to the west; there are magnificent ilex (oak) trees which throw broad, square spaces of solid shade. The young ilex sprouts all over the lower slopes of the hills, imitating holly in its early stages. The spreading poplar is the glory of many a village, and the ubiquitous “bher,” or jujube, is in every low-lying nullah. And Waziristan possesses a glorious group of mountains, culminating in two giant peaks— Shuidar to the north, Pirghal to the south - each of them rising 11,000 feet above the plains of the Indus, and standing like twin sentinels, guardians of the western passes of the country. From Shuidar, looking northward, one may see the flat, white back of the Safed-Koh, which divides the Khyber from the Kuram, culminating in Sikaram (16,000 feet), and from Pirghal, the craggy outline of Kaisarghar, the highest peak of the mountain called the Takht-i-Suliman, bars further view to the south. From both peaks westward there stretches a boundless vista of ridge and hazy plain, a diapason of tender distances fainting to lighter tints of blue, until it is only against the yellowing evening sky that the pale silhouette of the hills that stand about Ghazni can be detected.”

So it may easily be understood that the soul of a surveyor would be possessed with a longing to stand on Shuidar and Pirghal, and definitely and forever fix therefrom a large array of landscape points such as would enable his explorers, groping their artful way about the borders of Afghanistan, to tie up their work with satisfactory exactness. Besides, all Waziristan to the east could be overlooked from them.

The opportunity came in the spring of 1881. The Waziris had previously been on the war path, and had raided Tank, a town not far from Dera Ismail Khan, which lies conveniently handy to the hills, and which is periodically burnt to the ground-much to its advantage, probably. I know some other frontier towns that would be the wholesomer for the process. But such a deliberate insult could not pass unavenged, and as the political process of blockading (i.e. stopping all trade and traffic with the country) proved unavailing, a force was organised to hunt the recalcitrant chiefs and compel them to come in.”

The Waziri Field Force was divided into two columns, a northern and southern. It was the southern force, under General Kennedy, which was expected to meet with most resistance, and to bring to restitution the arch-offender Mullah Mushk-i-

Alam (Mushaki), who was supposed to be responsible for the mischief done in the raid on Tank. This is where the world first became introduced to the Afghans and caves. Mushaki dwelt in caves; or at any rate he was in the habit, under stress of adverse circumstances, to take refuge in a cave, which he considered a more secure position than his village home. The frontier Pathan very frequently lives in caves, and always, if he can, keeps up a connection with cave-residences in the hills, where his wife and family may be stowed away when he takes the field for a doubtful campaign. A well-drained and sufficiently well-lighted cave, with room for the smoke to get out without inconvenience, is not a bad substitute for a four walled house and is infinitely to be preferred to a tent in winter, so that cave-dwellings are not necessarily mere refuges for the destitute on the frontier; they frequently occupy the position of a country-house.

Major Higginson commanded the 1st Punjab Infantry on active service in Waziristan with the Mahsud Wazirs (Waziris) (Wuzeeree) Expedition from 12 March to 18 May 1881 p. 53-55

Strength of Field Force assembled at Tank on 12th April 1881.

	EFFECTIVE.		SICK.		7-pr. guns.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Fighting men.	Officers.	Fighting men.		
Brigadier-General Kennedy, Colonel Godby, Assistant Adjutant General, Assistant Quarter Master General, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, two Aides-de-Camp, Staff Surgeon, Provost Marshal, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.						
Head-quarters staff ...	10	Troops and distribution. <i>Cavalry Brigade.</i> 1st Punjab Cavalry } Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. McLean, c.b., Commanding. 4th Punjab Cavalry }
Commissariat ...	1	
Transport ...	2	<i>Infantry, unattached to any Brigade.</i> 8th Company Sappers and Miners. 1st Sikh Infantry. 32nd Pioneers.
(1) Field Park, (2) Superintendent Signalling, (3) Survey ...	6	
Total ...	19	<i>1st Brigade.</i> 4th Sikh Infantry } Lieutenant-Colonel H. Close 1st Punjab Infantry } Commandant 4th Punjab Infantry 2nd Punjab Infantry } Commandant
1st Punjab Cavalry ...	3	111	...	2	...	<i>2nd Brigade.</i> 3rd Punjab Infantry } Lieutenant-Colonel B. Chambers, Commandant 4th Punjab Infantry } 6th Punjab Infantry }
4th Punjab Cavalry ...	7	288	...	1	...	
Total ...	10	349	...	3	...	<i>Artillery.</i> 2nd Mountain Battery } 3rd Mountain Battery } 4th Mountain Battery }
Sappers ...	1	72	...	2	...	Grand Total.
2nd Mountain Battery ...	3	111	...	1	3	
3rd Mountain Battery ...	5	194	...	1	6	
4th Mountain Battery ...	3	106	...	2	3	
Total ...	11	411	...	4	12	
1st Sikh Infantry ...	8	557	...	12	...	EFFECTIVE.
4th Sikh Infantry ...	8	566	...	4	...	
1st Punjab Infantry ...	8	498	...	11	...	SICK.
2nd Punjab Infantry ...	8	554	...	4	...	
3rd Punjab Infantry ...	7	549	...	2	...	Men.
4th Punjab Infantry ...	8	510	...	12	...	
6th Punjab Infantry ...	8	570	...	2	...	Officers.
32nd Pioneers ...	8	440	...	7	...	
Total ...	63	4,244	...	54	...	19
Head-quarters staff and departments	10
Cavalry	11
Artillery	63
Infantry	4,244
Sappers	72
Total	104
						5,076

Mahsud Wazirs (Waziris) (Wuzeeree) Expedition, 12 March to 18 May 1881

This Operation was part of what would become a series of operations into Waziristan and the Black Mountain areas of the North-West Frontier. The first major attempts to bring control of Waziristan began with two expeditions of the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force (including the 1st Punjab Infantry) in 1859 and 1860 lead by Brigadier General Nevil Chamberlain, C.B. He had a very optimistic view of what the results would be from these expeditions.

The objects of the expedition were twofold: first, and chiefly, to demand the surrender of the six men who were leaders in the burning of the town of Tank on 1st January 1879; and, secondly, to exact a fine for the various raids committed in British territory.

The methods and significance of these Operations will be examined at the end of this section.

Events, place descriptions, routes of march, and weather conditions are from three officer accounts in, *The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition of 1881, Simla: Government Central Branch Press, 1884.*³⁴

General Outline of the Expedition against the Mahsud Wazirs, 1881.

The main force moved from Tank by Kot Khirgi to Jandola, which was reached on 23 April, when the pass leading to the Shahur Valley was reconnoitred without opposition.

³⁴ *The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition of 1881, Simla: Government Central Branch Press, 1884:* C. H. Manners-Smith, Lieutenant, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Waziri Field Force, 20 May 1881, *Diary of the Waziri Field Force*, p.104-126; George F Young, Captain, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, 2nd Column, Waziri Field Force, *Report on Routes traversed by the 2nd Brigade, Waziri Field Force, May 1881*, p. 127-139 and C. Gordon, Lieutenant, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, 2nd Column, Waziri Field Force, *March of the 2nd Column from Bannu to Razmak and back*, p.140-151.

The column then moved on by Haidari Kach and Turam China to Barwand, and so far, although the rearguard was always fired on, there had been no casualties and nothing in the way of serious opposition had been experienced, while some of the headmen had already submitted.

The force now moved on towards the Khaisora Valley, and on arrival in this neighbourhood the Alizais made terms, but the troops were now in the country of the Nana Khels, who showed a good deal of hostility.

On 5 May General Kennedy arrived at Kaniguram via Kundiwan, having had a sharp affair with some 500 Bahlolzais holding the densely wooded slopes about Shah Alum. Makin was reached on the 10th, by which date the Bannu column was encamped at Razmak, only seven miles distant.

On 16 April this brigade had moved from Bannu and had taken up a position on the right bank of the Tochi River near Miriam, commanding the entrances of the Khaisora, Tochi and Shakto valleys. General Gordon, in compliance with instructions received from General Kennedy, marched up the Khaisora Valley to Razmak via Saroba and Razani practically unopposed, being accompanied by representatives of the sections inhabiting the valley. A convoy of supplies was passed from here to Makin, and on 12 May the Bannu column began to retire, visiting the Shakto Valley *en route* and having only one casualty in the force. On the next day General Kennedy marched from Makin via Janjal to Jandola, and arrived on the 18th unmolested at Tank, where the column was broken up. The total British casualties during these operations only amounted to thirty-two killed and wounded.

The Mahsuds seemed now ready and eager to make peace, but still Punjab and Indian Government terms remained uncompiled with, and the blockade consequently was reimposed; and it was not until September of this year, and after several fruitless attempts to play off the Amir against the British Government, that the Mahsuds finally gave in. They surrendered the remaining ones among the proscribed ringleaders in the 1879 outrages, but since the aggregate of the fines accumulated against them now appeared quite beyond their powers of payment, it was agreed that the amount should gradually be liquidated by a tax imposed on all Mahsud goods imported into our territory, and for a breathing space at least quiet reigned on this portion of the border.

12 March 1881. *The Regiment received Telegraphic Instructions to hold itself in readiness for active service, and in consequence all men on Furlough were recalled, which call was responded to with alacrity by all ranks and the cheerful conduct of the men when on service in Waziristan was most praiseworthy.*

The Government of India sanctioned (G340B, dated 12 March 1881) this expedition against the Mahsud-Waziri Tribe. The regiment was to be formed into 6 companies, Colours were not to be taken. Weak and sickly men were to be left in cantonments. Each man was to carry 200 rounds of ammunition. Signalers were to be extra above the strength of 500 men. The rendezvous of the various corps was to be at Tank on 11 April.

27 March. *The Regiment commenced its march for active service in Waziristan this day each man carrying 72 rounds of ammunition in pouch; the following British officers accompany the Regiment:*

- *Major T. Higginson, Commanding,*
- *Major A. Vallings, 2nd in Command.*
- *Captain H. Howell, Officiating Wing Commander.*
- *Captain Lorne Campbell, Officiating Quarter Master.*
- *Lieutenant C. B. Brownlow, Officiating Adjutant.*
- *Surgeon Major Duncan, in Medical charge.*

The Depot of the Regiment was formed and placed in charge of Lieutenant Jameson, 5th Punjab Infantry.

Along the line of communications semi-permanent heliograph signalling stations were established.

31 March. *The Regiment on its march between Latummur and Edwardesabad was caught in a very severe storm of thunder and rain which thoroughly wet all ranks and damaged the ammunition in pouch. The Kurrum river was found in flood and crossed with great difficulty; but the high spirit that prevailed all ranks, overcame all difficulties and the river was crossed without any casualties—no easy matter with a long train of baggage animals and reserve ammunition.*

A very heavy rain fell in the evening of this day. The rains forced a portion of the 1st Punjab Infantry to remain on the left bank of the Kuram river.

1 April 1881. *The Regiment halted at Edwardesabad and formed another Depot for heavy baggage, and to leave all weakly men behind.*

Due to the heavy rains the ground was a swamp, and unfitted for men to camp. They were accommodated by the 4th Punjab Cavalry and the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry, chiefly in the barrack verandahs for the night.

While halted at Edwardesabad the Punjab Government sanctioned free rations for troops and followers while serving across the border.

4 April. *The Regiment marched out of Edwardesabad towards Tank on Cabul scale of equipment and baggage.*

Field Force head-quarters moved to Tank. The Punjab Government authorized the issue of a free blanket and a free pair of shoes to the followers.

The 14th and 26th Native Infantry were placed into service at the discretion of Brigadier Kennedy. These regiments were placed in the Reserve Brigade at Edwardesabad.

5 April. A telegraphic line was commenced from Tank to the Border Post at Kot Kirghi.

6 April. Slight showers and cloudy in the morning. Heavy clouds over part of the Waziri hills.

Orders were issued to check the regiment for all men unfit to stand the severities of campaigning.

7 April. Slight showers and cloudy in the morning. Heavy rain fell to the west in the hills.

8 April. Tank *The Regiment reached Tank and halted.*

Under telegraphic orders from Quarter Master General, the 5th Punjab Infantry were to replace the 26th Punjab Native Infantry for the reserve brigade. Commanding officers of regiments were ordered to prepare nominal rolls of all muleteers, camelmen, and kahars attached to their brigades, and to keep up a careful record of all casualties for eventual transmission to Chief Commissariat Officer to enable him to settle with heirs.

9 April. Tank Halted *Lieutenant W. C. Pollard, 16th Bengal Cavalry attached to the Regiment by B. O. No. 18, dated 30 March 1881 reported his arrival.*

Arrivals at Tank: 1st Sikh Infantry (having marched from Abbottabad, 250 miles in 17 marches, without a halt³⁵) and 1st Punjab Infantry.

The 5th Punjab Infantry directed to join Reserve Brigade (under orders from Quarter Master General), 26th Native Infantry replacing them at Kohat.

11 April. Tank Halted

Smart showers fell in the evening.

12 April. Tank Halted *Lieutenant W. G. Carter reported his arrival from leave to study the native languages.*

³⁵ During May-June 1881 the 1st Sikh Infantry marched 300 miles from Makin to Abbil in 23 days.


The Regiment was appointed to form part of the 1st Brigade consisting of 4th Sikhs, and the 1st and 3rd Punjab Infantry, under command of Colonel Close 4th Punjab Infantry.

The assembly of the Field Force was completed by the arrival of No. 3 Mountain Battery, 6 guns No. 4 Mountain Battery, 3 guns 4th Punjab Infantry, and 4th Sikh Infantry.

Smart rain fell in the evening.

13 April. Tank Halted Very heavy rain fell in the morning, swamping a portion the camp.

14 April. Tank Halted Heliographic communication was opened up with Sheikh Budin in the morning (22 miles), but clouds prevented regular work. Heavy clouds during the day and an appearance of severe rain in the hills.



Application was made to the Military Secretary, Punjab Government to establish a telegraph station at Sheikh Budin, so as to repeat by electric telegraph any messages received by heliograph from the hills, there being a fear that owing to the approach of the hot weather it might not always be possible to signal Dera Ismail Khan.

15 April. Tank Halted The Force for the Mahsood Wazirie (Mahsud Waziri) Expedition paraded for inspection of Brigadier General Kennedy C.B.

The telegraph line to Kot Kirghi (commenced on 5th) was completed, including a branch from the main line to Zam outpost, for use at first encamping ground after leaving Tank.

17 April. Zam The Regiment marched to Zam—6 miles. With the Advance Guard.

← Map of the Expedition against the Mahsud Wazirs 1860 and 1881. 20 km = 12.43 miles. Map Locations in () are behind locations recorded in the Regimental account.

The Advance guard during the Expedition was the 1st Sikhs. With the superior marching skills of this regiment this was not a surprise. (see 9 April entry)

18 April. Zam The 1st Punjab Infantry halted at Zam.

The main force marched to Zam beginning at 5:30 A.M.

No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners and. 32nd Pioneers; small bridges over watercuts being widened, &c. West of the Zam

post, the Zam river was crossed; the stream which runs in numerous channels was swollen and rapid, but presented no real difficulty to laden mules.

Camp was pitched about a mile north-west of Zam post and on right bank of the Zam or one of its branches, on ground very stony and sloping gradually from hills on the west, distant from camp about 1,500 yards; their underfeatures on the west almost melting on the camp boundaries. Altitude of crest 2,150 feet above sea.

The march having commenced at 5:30, the baggage of the force had filed off at 8:10 A.M. The commissariat camels, with general supplies began to file past at 8:10 and had all started by 10:15. The rear guard started at 10:30 A.M. and reached camp at 3:30 P.M.

Reconnaissances were made of the route to Kirghi by the Zam river and by a hill road over the range west of camp, but owing to the swollen state of the river, the hill road was believed to be preferable (via road known as the Zam and Giri).

In the afternoon the following Waziri chiefs having come in for the purpose of discussing overtures of peace were allowed to proceed to the Zam outpost, and a halt was ordered with discussion to take place on the 19th.

Signalling with Sheikh Budin carried out, distance 28 miles.

19 April. Zam Halted

Omur Khan, Matiri, and Hashim (son of Yatin) surrendered to the demands of Government. They were formally made prisoners and marched to the Zam post under an escort of 1 Native officer, 50 picked men of the 4th Sikh Infantry, under Major Scott, Bengal Cavalry, and on the following day were marched to Tank, and Omur Khan was thence sent in by mail cart to be imprisoned in the jail at Dera Ismail Khan.

20 April. Zam Halted

Reconnoitring parties were sent out to report on the state of the river Zam which had considerably reduced in volume. Early in the morning a jirgah of Mahsud Waziris was received by the political officer and Brigadier-General in camp.

Arrangements were made for carrying the telegraph wire to Jhandola.

The road to Jhandola was reconnoitred by Lieutenant Manners-Smith, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.

21 April. *The Regiment marched to Kirgee (Kot Kirghi)—6 miles.*

The force marched to Kot Kirghi at 5:30 A.M. The rear guard arrived in camp at 5 P.M. All encamped on the plateau except the 1st Sikh Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, Royal Engineers, Signalling party and all Commissariat cattle. These latter were encamped at the Kachi at the foot of the cliffs under Kot Kirghi, on right bank of the Zam.

Signalling communication with Sheikh Budin, at a point 300 yards north of post, distance 35 miles.

The artillery and 2nd Punjab Infantry marched by the zigzag or Girnit route over the low hills west of camp. The rest of the force by the ordinary Zam road. The river was in no places (care having been taken to mark out with stones the line of fords the day previously) no more than about 2 feet 6 inches deep.

The Kirghi plateau is about 150 feet above the level of the Zam river to which the drop is precipitous (a cliff of conglomerate). The plateau affords an excellent encamping ground for an unlimited number of men; ground stony, but the stones are mostly small and of no practical inconvenience; natural drainage good; soil more or less sandy and dotted with small tufts of grass. (The plateau just now is fairly well covered with the "prophet flower.")

The water-supply is more or less of a difficulty. From the Zam post, about 200 yards south, two roads lead down to the Zam river, distance from the post about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile; road good, and north of it are two bad tracks down to the water, distance to water perhaps $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Firewood none, except that brought in by contractors. Green crops in the Kachi below the post. Camel fodder sufficient.

22 April. *The Regiment marched to Jundoola (Jhandola) (Map-Jandola)—6 miles, and crossed the Frontier. Free Rations being supplied to the force.*

The day described as, “a deliciously cool morning.”

The force marched at 5:30 A.M. The rear guard started at 2 P.M. and arrived at 5:15 P.M. The water of the Zam, which is crossed frequently, was swollen and in places somewhat difficult from its velocity, though with care, crossings could be effected at 3 feet throughout if not less.

Camp was pitched on the Chin-Chin Kachi about 1 mile past the Innis Tangi. At this spot on the left bank of the river is a considerable irregular shaped level, under grass, and another level rising from it a few feet with an average width of 220 yards and of very considerable extent east to Jhom this northerly rises a low ridge about 60 or 100 feet, the top of which is a stony plateau on which a considerable force could be encamped.

Grass plentiful; a few isolated trees dotted here and there. Camel grazing fairly plentiful. Firewood sufficient.

Signalling with Sheikh Budin, 40 miles, was carried out by an intermediate post on the hill (Altitude 3,500 feet) rising south of Innis Tangi. Sheikh Bldin was, however, unable to communicate with Dera. Ismail Khan (by reason of summer haze it is presumed).

A field telegraph office-in camp was opened.

The orders for the cavalry were to lead (on reaching open ground and leaving $\frac{1}{2}$ the number at Jhandola on picquet duty, to reconnoitre as far as Dotak (the junction of the Shahor and Zam).

A cavalry reconnaissance was made as far as the Shahot Tangi and tools were issued to Waziri workmen for road-making purposes.

The change in temperature at Jhandola (especially at night) was appreciable.

23 April.

The Engineers were employed (chiefly in blasting) on road-making through part of the Shahor Tangi.

24 April. *The Regiment marched to Hydera Kutch—9 miles.*

The force having left Jhandola, the line of telegraph wire was left in charge of Bhattannis, the office establishment returning to Kirghi.

Signalling communication with Sheikh Budin from the summit of Kar Gundi, distance 46 miles.

25 April. *The Regiment marched to Toran Chinna (Tarun China)—5 miles.*

Tarun China is the name of a spring “The Spring of Tarun.” It issues near the foot of a low hill jutting out on to the right bank of the Shahor. Its capacity is about 1,000 gallons per minute (roughly estimated), and after being worked upon by the Royal Engineers. The water-supply for cattle was in a stream, about a mile south of camp, plentiful. Camel-grazing plentiful. Wood in sufficient quantity. The force encamped on right bank of stream, commencing at the low hill above mentioned.

Ground is ample; part of the force was encamped on cultivated ground; crops having been cut (and paid for) but irrespective of this is an uncultivated space sufficient for the camp of a large force; ground good, and bounded by a ridge of hills.

The rear guard leaving Haidari Kach at 9:50 A.M. arrived at 1:45 P.M.; distance 5 miles. The cavalry reconnoitred to within 2 miles of Barwand. A reconnaissance of Samashi which had previously been ordered was countermanded.

At Tarun China is the small square insignificant mud fort of Mula Haibat (Sheikh). A signal party ascended to Tijal Kheyli hill, altitude about 4,600, and signalled to Sheikh Budin, which was clearly distinguished, but did not succeed in obtaining a reply.

26 April. *The Regiment Marched to Barwand (Barwand)—7 miles, and formed the Rear Guard of the Force, whilst the Pickets were being withdrawn they were fired on by the enemy as also was the Regiment during its march. There were some near shots, but no casualties occurred.*

The rear guard, starting at 8 A.M., reached camp at 12 o'clock noon.

About a mile, after leaving camp, a broad level open treeless plain on right bank of Shahor Nullah was traversed for some 2 miles (waterless); parts of it are cultivated at times apparently. The land belongs to the Shaman Kheyli; that on the left bank of the Shahor to the Alizai. Then the road drops down into the Shahor at a point where a low hill juts out on to its bank. Thence forward the road traverses the Shahor if the encamping ground at Barwand is to be on the left bank of the Shahor, or if it is to be on the right bank, after following the bed of the nullah for about a mile and at a point where another hill juts out on to its right bank, it ascends the right bank, which is generally scarped, and traverses a level plateau.

A very severe thunderstorm came on just as the camp was being pitched, rain continuing (heavy at first, afterwards slight) for about 2 hours.

27 April. *The Regiment marched to Tunji Ruqza (Tanzi Ragza, Tangi Raghza)—6 miles and halted.*

During the night some firing at the picquets took place) no damage being done on our side; unfortunately the dak-bearer was shot by the 3rd Punjab Infantry picquet. The Force marched at 5 A.M. with the object of reaching Narai Ragza. The rear guard reached camp at Noon.

About 3 miles the column advanced, cavalry leading to a point where the hills close in. The 1st Sikhs were then ordered to form an advance guard, the cavalry falling back.

In this formation the troops advanced to within about a mile of the Narai Tangi defile. The words Narai and Tangi are apparently the same and mean "narrow". At this spot, about 6 miles from Barwand, a road branching off to the right (north-west) stated to be fit for camels and to turn entirely th Narai Tangi, was reconnoitred, the advance guard at the same time pushing through the Narai. The road on the left was found impracticable for camels (except on a pinch). Further, the Narai Tangi was quite impracticable. Its width would hardly enable a laden camel to pass through. A huge round rock rolled down from above has caught between the sides of the pass and rendered it virtually a short narrow tunnel. The height to this rock is sufficient to allow mounted men to pass under.

The depth of water, when the river is at its (apparent to-day) normal depth, is about 3 feet in this Tangi.

The river-bed in this defile being, say, 4,800 feet, the hills on the northwest rise to a height of about 6,000 feet. It presents no real difficulties to infantry, and may be described as an isolated hill (connected with others on its north by a low saddle gap); over this gap the road made for the next day's march passes.

On the south-east of the pass the hills, though high, are not in reality very difficult for light infantry, if only opposed to matchlock men.

No signaling (to Derajat). Sheikh Budin not visible from any hill near camp.

Slight rain fell in the evening.

It is evident that the Waziri bills (in these parts at all events) become rounder and easy for infantry (by comparison with the hills on most parts of the frontier) the further the higher spurs are penetrated. During this last march a few very insignificant hamlets were passed, also two water-mills and some curiously and ingeniously contrived water channels for irrigation purposes carried round ledges of rock and sometimes as such tunnelled. The destruction of these would cause great loss to the holders.

28 April. Halt Tangi Raghza *A covering party of 100 Rifles under Lieutenants Carter and Pollard was ordered to cover the working party employed in making the road and engaged the enemy. No casualties on our side. The enemy kept up a considerable fire which was returned briskly.*

A party of 100 men from each infantry regiment of the Punjab Field Force (7 regiments) and Pioneers and Sappers and workmen had been ordered over night to continue the work commenced previously by the Pioneers, road to next camp (Narai Tangi). A cavalry reconnaissance was to shoot ahead of these and to report on the road to Kundi Wam. It was found, however, that the Waziris to the extent of a few hundred were ready to contest the road, and the reconnaissance under the circumstances not being convenient, the roadmaking party was strengthened with the whole of the 4th Punjab Infantry, 3 guns, No. 4 Mountain Battery, and a company 6th Punjab Infantry.

There was a good deal of firing during the day, resulting in, it is believed, perhaps, 12 or more casualties to the Waziris, and 4 wounded on our part.

In the afternoon a very severe storm set in, and heavy rain continued until late at night. The night passed quietly. The letter bags to and from Kot Kirghi were plundered.

The Field Hospital has been empty so far.

29 April. *The Regiment marched to Narai Ruqza, 4 miles, and furnished the day pickets round the Grazing ground, there was some skirmishing with the enemy who kept at a very long distance. No casualties on our side.*

The force marched about 7 A.M. distance, 4, miles. After marching about 2 miles, it was found the Waziris in great force were in position the same as yesterday. A reconnaissance in force and working party being necessary on the onward road, the whole force, except a part left to guard camp and the line of march of baggage, moved on, driving back the Waziris who, though making a show of resistance, in reality offered no opposition to the advance which was made as far as the Kotal, overlooking Kundi Wam. Casualties, one man wounded. The last of the Commissariat camels did not reach camp till 11:45 P.M. (midnight). The night passed generally quietly, a few shots only having been fired by picquets at a few men prowling about.

On the 28th most of the men had a severe day's work; many of them were out road-making or covering working parties up to late hour, and for some time in a cold drenching rain. The picquets one and all (and a large number were necessitated by the nature of the ground) were in drenching cold rain, (minimum thermometer 56.5). Next morning it was noticed by several officers how cheerful they were on the bugle sounding for the march.

30 April. *The Regiment marched to Kundewan (Kundiwam) Kundi Wam and halted. Distance 6 miles.*

The force marched at 5 A.M. The route lay up the bed of the Shane Wano stream, which was followed for about 2½ miles, gradient easy, bed sandy, a little trickling water in the bed.

This pass is more sense easy in that a few men posted on the right and left on certain obvious situations command it well, the ascents to these generally being easy, but there is a good deal of brushwood and cover in ravines, in which adepts like the Waziris could find ground for lurking and annoying a long string of animals. The ascent then turns off to the Shane Wano Narai Kotal, and the road had to be made by the Pioneers. The summit of the Kotal is 5,850 feet, and taking into consideration that the last camp was 5,450 feet, the total rise from the bed of Shane Wano stream (which is

descended to, immediately after leaving camp) to the top of the Kotal can only be about 600 feet; the actual pass itself, from where the road leaves the Shane Wano, is perhaps a rise of 300 feet in a mile.

From the summit of this pass a good view is obtained west-southwest.

Hence the road had to be made for 6 miles or so when it struck the Shane Zawa Nullah, a sandy bed, trickling stream, broad; easy descent with easy hills on either side. This was followed for about 2 miles and opened into the Kundi Wam hollow.

Camp was pitched on the west end of this hollow, one face overlooking the Khisora stream but about 200 feet above it. One face first under a ridge of hills at west of the "vVam" and taking in the country between this and the two large villages or Shabi Kheyls, and the rest of camp perpendicular to or parallel with these faces. The villagers were invited to retain possession of their villages undisturbed.

The camping ground had to be cleared of khasil before pitching.

Water abundant from the Shahor stream, here known as the Khisora

It abounds in hill trout good eating; and officers with leisure found amusement in fishing too; the fish were small. entirely scarce.

Camel fodder good. Wood sufficient.

1 May 1881. *A party of the Regiment made the ascent of the Koonidighar (Kundighar) Mountain and met with no opposition.*

3 May. *The Regiment marched to Torawan (Torwam) 4 miles. At Shah Allum Ruqza (Shah Alam Ragzha) the enemy made a stand and occupied a high mountain to the front of camp, he was engaged by 1st Sikhs, 4th Punjab Infantry and 6th Punjab Infantry and was driven off the hill with considerable loss, the casualties on our side were very few. The Regiment was not engaged on this occasion.*

4 May. *The Regiment marched to Mogul Keyl, 3 miles.*

5 May. *The Regiment marched to Kanigorum (Kaniguram), 3 miles, and halted. The town was found deserted by the enemy.*

7 May. *The Regiment marched to Luni Kanigorum, 3 miles and halted.*

9 May. *The Regiment marched to Do Toi (Dwa Toi) 8 miles.*

10 May. *The Regiment marched to Sur Ruqza Makeen (Makin) and halted.*

13 May. *The Regiment commenced its return march to Tank via Zam Pass and marched to Jungal (Janjal), 8 miles.*

14 May. *The Regiment marched to Sur Rogho Ruqza (Sora Rogha), 10 miles.*

15 May. *The Regiment marched to Moorgibund, 9 miles.*

16 May. *The Regiment marched to Jundoolah (Jandola), 9 miles.*

17 May. *The Regiment marched to Zam, 10 miles and recrossed the British Frontier.*

18 May. *The Regiment marched to Tank, 6 miles and halted.*

The Waziri Field Force which marched from Tank on 18 April arrived to day and will be broken up.

Lieutenant W. G. Pollard 16th Bengal Cavalry temporarily attached to the regiment reported his departure to-day.

20 May. *The Regiment commenced its return march to Kohat where it arrived on 1 June, after an absence of over 2 months. The return march was very hot and trying but was performed with their usual spirit by all ranks.*

The Regiment in this expedition had no casualties in officers or men.

Lieutenant C. B. Brownlow appointed Adjutant, (Vide, G.G O. No.338, dated 24th June 1881).

Newspaper account of the Waziri Expedition

THE WAZIRI EXPEDITION.

"Pioneer," dated 10th May 1881 [FROM A CORRESPONDENT]

Not a few old frontier officers (old enough to remember the incidents of the last Waziri expedition) must have read with interest your late article on the subject of our present relations with the Waziris, and the circumstances of their submission; but only a few, I fancy, are prepared to go all the way with you in your estimate of the moral effect of that submission, and the general deductions that you draw therefrom. There can be little doubt in the minds of men who can look back through the last quarter of a century that our border relations are on a higher and better footing by many degrees than they were on the day when the Mahsuds offered so stout a resistance to General Chamberlain's advance. There is, perhaps, a better understanding on the far side of the border of the higher lights of civilization which guide our frontier policy, and there is surely a better appreciation of our power to enforce that which persuasion fails to accomplish. But there is no such change in the moral characteristics of our trans-frontier neighbours, anywhere between Peshawar and Baluchistan, as would lead them to such a step as that which your article assumes them to have taken, in *giving up* their chiefs simply for fear of a military demonstration. They have not given them up, and the distinction between surrendering them as prisoners and the voluntary surrender of the chiefs themselves (under strong home persuasion no doubt) is a very important one. In the latter case there can be no ground for the inevitable tribal feuds, which would certainly ensue were force used to compel submission, and which would probably lead to far worse evils than are ever likely to befall an uncivilised country from an invasion of British troops. On the other hand, the chiefs can pose temporarily as martyrs for the good of their country—well assured of their lives, and probably of their comforts, while under our fatherly care—and hopeful, may be, of a final triumphant return. Still the fact of their coming in (to use the ordinary political phrase) is sufficiently unusual to call for explanation. It was certainly unexpected, and there must have been unusual circumstances to account for the phenomenon. These circumstances are found readily enough, in the opinion of those best acquainted with the materials and their country, in the extra-ordinarily fine crops of the present year. After a long period of failures and destitution verging on starvation, there has come a year of most hopeful promise. Were this year's crops to be destroyed, starvation *must* ensue; while the promise of the fields is at present so good and fair, that the harvest in due course should more than counterbalance the previous years of failures. One can easily understand the strength of an argument which points, on the one hand, to starvation for wife, family, and people, and on the other to an honourable captivity, with the right perchance of shooting, in season and out of season, every head of game that can be slaughtered on a career of indiscriminate shikar. Little chiefs no doubt judge by what befalls big chiefs; and though their view may be mistaken, this, coupled with the advent of a force, which even a Mahsud must recognise as sufficient to wipe the annals of his country out of future history, is probably the only moral persuasion on which we can fairly congratulate ourselves as influencing the movements of the Waziri chiefs.

But we need not despair. We have many things to congratulate ourselves about, even if we are not altogether satisfied with the progress of light and culture across the border. No one who saw General Kennedy's force march out of Edwardesabad for Tank, or who could have stood by General Gordon as his brigade marched past at Meerean on the morning of the 2nd, could help feeling a really honest pride in the workman-like appearance of our "collapsed" (was it Colonel East who used that word?) Native army. Things which collapse are usually elastic; and

if we bow to Colonel East's assertion, the Native army is no exception to the rule. General Gordon's brigade consists almost entirely of troops who have been knocked about on service continuously for the last two years. The 5th Punjab Infantry (the only Frontier Force Regiment in the Brigade) went by 600 strong, followed by the 14th Sikhs (who have only just arrived from Pindi after averaging 17 miles a day continuous marching from Pindi to Bannu), the 20th, 21st and 30th—all looking fit, if need be, for an instant advance on St. Petersburg. The cavalry were represented by the 18th Bengal Cavalry, artillery by Carre's European mountain battery and two guns of Morgan's, while the Rifles formed the only European infantry contingent. This, with a Sapper company, makes up about as petty a little working party for a frontier expedition as could well be found in any country in the world, and in the matter of transport and commissariat it is thoroughly equipped. What a satisfaction it is to meet strings of fine, fat, healthy camels going to and fro in quest of fodder, and to walk down long lines of sleek, contented-looking (contented perhaps is hardly the word—the brutes are never contented) mules and ponies, only those who have been over the Khojak to Kandahar, or held their noses through some of the more specially unpleasant defiles of the Khyber, can tell! It is quite a revelation in the way of transport. If we have drained the transport supply of the Punjab to the dregs, all that an uninformed outsider can say about it is, that the dregs are most excellent. In good truth, the fact that so large a force as 9,000 men can be massed at any point in the frontier within a few weeks in such thorough workman-like form, and so efficiently equipped, is real matter of congratulation to anyone who chooses to think about it, and who has the advantage of being able to compare a not very remote past with the present—far more substantial than the doubtful results of that somewhat vague moral influence which we claim to have established over our border neighbours. Only "a soldier's view" perhaps; but we have hardly arrived at the stage when soldiers' views can be dispensed with by the Government of India, either as respects the inside or outside of her frontiers.

If any exception to the efficiency of equipment is to be made, it must be in the arrangements for heliographic signalling. The last map issued by the Survey Department (4 miles to the inch) will show pretty plainly that (assuming that each column advances westward from Tank and Bannu respectively and keeps up no intermediate posts) the Bannu column will only be able to flash to its base (in the fort at Bannu) occasionally when hills occur conveniently along the line of route with sufficient command to overlook Bannu; but the Tank column should always be able to flash to its base (Sheikh Budin), because Sheikh Budin is on a high hill, which itself commands nearly the whole line of route till it turns northward; and even then can be easily recognised from any fairly commanding hill. Bannu and Sheikh Budin (the two bases) meanwhile are always intervisible, so that it becomes a question merely of long shooting round three sides of a square (to put it roughly), of which each side may be said to be about 50 miles. For this purpose a staff of European signallers was sent to Bannu, numerically quite sufficient, but equipped with nothing but 3-inch heliographs—pretty little toys, which are good for about as many yards as they are wanted for miles. Luckily the Rifle Brigade had two 5-inch instruments, with which communication with Sheikh Budin is kept up with difficulty. At Sheikh Budin (the junction—the real strategic position of the whole heliographic campaign) there is indeed a 12-inch instrument, which works admirably; but there are no European signallers. The one officer, who nobly tries his patience and his eyes in deciphering messages from the little 5-inch light 50 miles away by the incessant use of a powerful telescope (needless to say the Native signallers are no good under the circumstances), is fairly used up. Should he go totally blind (as seems not improbable), the whole scheme must fall through. There is such an insatiable thirst for "portability, in these days that it is considered quite cheap at the cost of efficiency. "Tommy" can put a 3-inch heliograph into one pocket, and nearly get the stand into another, and so he is sent to work where he is never likely to have a ray of much less than 40 miles, and may possibly have to work over 60—much as if he should take a pea-shooter into action instead of his rifle.

*The Methods and Significance of Waziristan Operations: Culture and Combat*³⁶

Notwithstanding Chamberlain's optimism, it is perhaps not unsurprising that the 1859 and 1860 expedition appear to have had limited impact on the Waziristan frontier. Note that 'Northwest Frontier' clasps to the 1854 India General Service medal were awarded for both of these expeditions and not for the 1881 expedition. This raised the ire of most of the soldiers who participated in the 1881 expedition and a number of the members of parliament leading to several attempts to obtain a clasp in recognition of the 1881 expedition.

³⁶ See: Roy, Kaushik and Rand, Gavin, (eds.) *Culture, Conflict and the Military in Colonial South Asia*. Routledge, pp. 189-227.

In 1879, another large Mahsud raid on Tank compelled the Government of India to revisit their assessment of the 1860 expedition. The earlier optimism gave way to a more pessimistic conclusion: that ‘the Mahsuds’ stubborn and haughty refusal to make formal submission’ in 1860 reflected the tribe’s view that colonial troops were unable to penetrate ‘their fastnesses’ or ‘force the rugged defiles leading to their homes’³⁷. Another expedition was ordered and when colonial troops returned to Waziristan in 1881, they set out to prove their ability to penetrate and occupy trans-frontier territory: the commanding officer was instructed to ‘traverse and explore as much of the Mahsud hills as possible... your operations should be deliberate and free from all appearance of haste’³⁸. As we have already seen, this framing anticipated the inability of colonial troops to force decisive engagements against the tribes. As in 1860, there were few direct encounters between the expeditionary forces and the Mahsuds again chose to avoid prolonged engagements. In lieu of such engagements, colonial troops set about the symbolic and epistemological opening of the frontier, occupying outlying villages and undertaking extensive surveying operations. In fact, in the absence of direct encounters with the enemy, one of the measures by which the expedition’s success was calculated was the scale of survey work undertaken: according to the Punjab Government’s Military Secretary, ‘much new country has been unveiled’³⁹. Military surveying served overlapping purposes, at once practical and symbolic: cartography inscribed the penetration of tribal territory in the colonial archive and aided the planning and preparation of future operations⁴⁰. As on the Black Mountain, the epistemological opening of the frontier was directly equated with the symbolic ‘lifting of the *purdah*’ which the operations aimed to effect. In summarizing the lessons of the operations, *The Pioneer* opined that:

There is no measure which tends to the ultimate pacification of our frontier more thoroughly than the occupation by our troops of the remoter portions of the country inhabited by tribes who defy our authority. For it is only by such means that the conviction can be forced upon them that no strongholds which they possess are inaccessible to our arms. The course, which they themselves rather graphically describe as “lifting the *purdah*” of the tribe or section concerned, is essential to the permanent success of our military expeditions;...⁴¹

While surveying was a mechanism for ‘opening out’ the frontier – often with significant practical consequences – such operations were typically pursued only in the absence of opportunities to engage tribal *lashkars*. Thus, if frontier operations were often about ‘unveiling’ tribal territory, this was principally because colonial forces had no effective mechanism for forcing a decisive engagement. While cartography was often marshaled to evidence the range of colonial power – particularly by commanders and officers anxious to represent and quantify the fruits of their labour – it is worth noting that, before the 1881 expedition commenced, the Government of India explicitly reminded Kennedy, the commander of the 1881 expedition, that surveying *was not* one of the objectives of the operations, an instruction they subsequently repeated to Brigadier General Gordon during the expedition⁴². Whatever symbolic and practical effects military surveying bestowed, cartographic conquests assumed prominence only when decisive military engagements proved illusive.

The 1881 operations lasted a little under a month. When colonial troops withdrew, no submission had been received from the tribes and none of the principal conditions for settlement had been met. Despite this, the colonial archive records significant optimism about the effects of the expedition. The official report was laudatory and the Lieutenant-Governor anticipated that the punishment inflicted would ‘secure for a long time to come the peace and quiet on this part of our north-western border’: ‘To the whole Waziri nation from Kuram to the limits of Baluchistan, has been held up the spectacle of a tribe, numbered amongst the proudest and most powerful, compelled to permit a British army to traverse unopposed the

³⁷ Military Department, No. 43, February 1881, No. 2, dated Lahore, 3rd January 1881. W.M. Young, Esq., Secretary to the Government of the Punjab to The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department. IOR:L/MIL/17/13/107, pp. 8-9.

³⁸ The punishment was ‘held over’ because much of the Indian Army was already deployed in Afghanistan, a fact which may further evidence the strategic context for, and logic of, tribal calculations. Letter No. 1575, dated Lahore, 13 April 1881. From Colonel S. Black, Secretary to Government of the Punjab, Military Department to The Brigadier Commanding Mahsud-Waziri Expeditionary Force’, IOR, L/MIL/17/13/107, p. 47.

³⁹ *The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition of 1881*, Diaries of Officers of the Quarter Master General’s Department in India attached to the Mahsud-Waziri Expeditionary Force (Simla: Government Central Press, 1884), IOR: L/MIL/17/13/107, p. 85.

⁴⁰ For a wider discussion of the relationship between cartography and imperial expansion in South Africa see Mathew H. Edney *Mapping of Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁴¹ ‘The Lessons of the Waziri Expedition’, *Pioneer*, 20 June 1881. Reprinted in: *The Mahsud-Waziri Expedition of 1881*, Diaries of Officers of the Quarter Master General’s Department in India attached to the Mahsud-Waziri Expeditionary Force (Simla: Government Central Press, 1884), IOR: L/MIL/17/13/107, p. 94.

⁴² No. 1526a. Memorandum, Submitted for the information of the Government of India, with reference to Military Department No 10300K dated 7th May 1881, NAI: Foreign Department Proceedings, Political B, August 1881, Nos. 138-9.

length and breadth of its country, while from the summit of Prighal and the heights of the Shuedar surveyors mapped and explored valleys and mountains hitherto regarded as asylums inaccessible to invasion.⁴³

Reprocessing the official narrative, H. L. Nevill underlined the same point, diverting attention from the palpable failure of the operations – at least in terms of the narrow military criterion established at their outset – by emphasizing the cartographic and symbolic successes of the operations: ‘Much valuable survey work was accomplished during these operations, the purdah had been effectually lifted and the tribesmen overawed’, though he acknowledged, that ‘the absence of any decisive military success somewhat discounted the value of these results’⁴⁴.

The results were indeed discounted: despite the optimism recorded at the conclusion of the expedition, hostilities with the Waziris resumed in 1894, when a colonial force working to delimit the ‘Durand Line’ was attacked at Wana. The attack, which killed 45 colonial troops, prompted yet another expedition to be dispatched into Mahsud territory⁴⁵. Like most of its predecessors, the Waziristan Field Force of 1895 encountered little direct resistance⁴⁶. Evelyn Howell, British Resident in Waziristan in the 1920s, reported that, ‘as in 1881 there was little or no fighting’⁴⁷. In the absence other engagements, the Field Force targeted valleys which ‘had never been visited by our troops, and were looked on as the strongholds of the Mahsud tribe’⁴⁸. While the ‘visit’ of colonial troops meant significant material losses in property and crops, the strategic significance of these operations was explained in cultural terms: ‘the fact of our having lifted their “pardah” in these remote glens will doubtless itself have a good effect on the tribe’⁴⁹. When operations were brought to a close in March, the expedition was said to have been ‘absolutely successful’. According to the official history: ‘All sections of the Mahsud tribe concerned in the attack on the British camp at Wana were severely punished... From the map, which accompanies this history, it will be seen that Waziristan was traversed from one end to the other, and that our troops penetrated into the remotest glens of the Mahsud country, and lifted the “pardah”, from the enemy’s most inaccessible strongholds.’⁵⁰

If the spectacular nature of these operations is clear, it should be noted that, as in previous campaigns, the performance of imperial dominion in these terms – through signal destruction, promenading and survey operations – was a response to the Mahsuds’ calculated decision not to oppose the advance of colonial troops. While the absence of tribal resistance was sometimes taken as evidence of submission or deference, other readings are possible. The casualty lists from the 1894 operations indicate that while only four colonial soldiers were killed by enemy action, fully 171 died of pneumonia before the operations were wound down. If these data help us to understand why ecology was so central to colonial visions of frontier conflict, they may also help us to better understand the strategic calculations which guided tribal responses to colonial incursions. Retreat, obfuscation and delay served tribal ends by exploiting the epistemological and logistical weaknesses of the imperial military: exposing their relative lack of mobility, straining parlous supply lines and confounding the temporal discipline of colonial interventions. These actions were not the product of inalienable tribal culture or of cowardice; they reflected calculated and rationale choices which can be understood as such.

Battle Honour for Afghanistan 1878-1880

⁴³ Letter from the Punjab Government, No 61 dated Lahore 23rd Feb 1882, From W.M. Young Secretary to the Government of Punjab to C. Grant, CSI, Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, NAI: Foreign Department Proceedings, Political A, July 1882, 8-40, No. 8.

⁴⁴ Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier*, p. 92.

⁴⁵ For a detailed breakdown of the attackers/dead (which shows that they were from a variety of sections), see *Operations Against the Mahsud-Wazirs by a force under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir W.S.A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I. in 1894-95*, IOR: L/MIL/17/13/108, p. 24.

⁴⁶ Wylly, *From the Black Mountain to Waziristan*, p. 465.

⁴⁷ See Sir Evelyn Berkeley Howell, *Mizh: A Monograph on Government’s Relations with the Mahsud Tribe* (Simla: Government of India Press, 1931), p. 9, IOR: V/27/273/3.

⁴⁸ *Operations Against the Mahsud-Wazirs by a force under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir W.S.A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I. in 1894-95*, IOR: L/MIL/17/13/108, p. 36.

⁴⁹ *Operations Against the Mahsud-Wazirs by a force under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir W.S.A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I. in 1894-95*, IOR: L/MIL/17/13/108, p. 46.

⁵⁰ *Operations Against the Mahsud-Wazirs by a force under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir W.S.A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I. in 1894-95*, IOR: L/MIL/17/13/108, p. 62.

8 August 1881. The Regiment permitted to bear on its appointments the word: “Afghanistan 1878-79” *Vide* G. G. O. No. 418, of 1881.

Promotion and Command of the 1st Punjab Infantry

26 June 1882. Major Higginson was advanced to Lieutenant Colonel on 26 June 1882.

1883-1885. The 1883, '84 and '85 Harts Army Lists shows the Regiments main duty station was Kohat.

1 April 1884. Lieutenant-Colonel T. Higginson assumes Command of the Regiment. p. 58

May 1884. Lieutenant-Colonel Theo. Higginson, Wing Commander and 2nd in Command is appointed Commandant by G. G. O. No. 224, dated 25th April 1884. p. 58

5 December. The Regiment under Command of Lieutenant Colonel T. Higginson marched from Kohat to Dera Ismail Khan in relief of 5th Punjab Infantry and arrived on 18th December 1884. p. 59

February 1885. Constitution of Regiment changed to Two Companies of Dogras and one Company of Trans Indus Cis Border Mohamedans instead of two companies of Trans Indus Cis Border Mohamedans. (Government of India, Military Department letter No. 719-B, dated 23rd December 1884.) Military Secretary Government of Punjab letter No. 1 dated, 2nd January 1885, and Punjab Government Order Military Department, No. 9, dated 23rd January 1885. p. 59

20 November 1885. Lieutenant Colonel T. Higginson left for England on furlough. Lieutenant Colonel A. Vallings appointed Officiating Commandant. p. 60.

1886-1888. The 1886, '87 and '88 Harts Army Lists shows the Regiments main duty station was Dera Ismail Khan.



14 July 1886. “Lieutenant Colonel T. Higginson, Commandant, promoted to Colonel in the Army, 26th June 1886, G. G. O. No. 438 of 1886.” p. 60

28 December. Colonel T. Higginson, Commandant, rejoins from Furlough to Europe on 27th December 1886. p. 61

Colonel Higginson, Commandant 1st Punjab Infantry, ends recording the Digest of Services at Dera Ismail Khan on 7 June 1887.

⇐ *1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, 1889. Punjabi Musalman Naik, Dogra Lance Naik and Yusufzai Havildar*

1889-1891. The 1889, '90 and '91 Harts Army Lists shows the Regiments main duty station was Edwardesabad. In 1890 Edwardesabad was established as the Regiments permanent Regimental Centre.

Colonel Higginson relinquished the appointment of Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry on 31 March 1891. Colonel C. C. Brownlow, Staff Corps appointed Commandant, 1 April 1891. Colonel Higginson had commanded the Regiment for 7 years from 1 April 1884 to 1 April 1891.



1892-1894. The 1892, '93 and '94 Harts Army Lists shows the Regiments main duty station was Kohat.

Colonel Higginson was awarded a C.B., London Gazette, 3 June 1893.

⇐ *Colonel Higginson the commanding officer of the 1st Punjab Infantry, dating probably c. 1893-94. He wears the distinctive rifle uniform peculiar to British officers of the regiment, based on the King's Royal Rifle Corps ie. dark green with red collar and cuffs and black braid. The helmet is black with a pagri similar to the pale blue and green with gold stripes colouring of the turbans worn by the men of the regiment. Clearly seen are his CB and 2nd Afghan Medal. The photograph was taken by Maull and Fox, London.*

The regiment was stationed at Dera Ismail Khan in 1902.

He died in Farnham, Surrey on 30 August 1903 and was buried at St. Thomas, Bourne, Surrey on 2 September 1903.